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1.0  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
This report addresses whether the Area Security Operations Command and Control (ASOCC) 
system can adequately support the full range of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service’s 
(NCIS) Multi-Threat Alert Center (MTAC) information processes.  It also examines whether 
MTAC’s mission should expand to become more directly involved in Homeland Security (HLS).  
 
 
1.1 BROAD SUMMARY  
 
Currently MTAC's major function is ingesting and analyzing intelligence information to produce 
assessments and provided them to naval units.  Much of the work is long range, fusing and 
assessing information from a variety of sources to determine the threat background.  Less 
frequent is providing warnings of immediate danger.   
 
ASOCC is designed to support information processes for Crisis and Consequence Management.  
The information provided is local and real-time, from human observations and a variety of 
sensors.  There is a heavy emphasis on information display and collaboration to support 
situational awareness and decision-making.  There is a mismatch between MTAC's basic mission 
and the operations ASOCC is designed to support, but a match in some of the functionalities 
needed for both.  A system designed for real-time information, and associated user- friendly 
displays, can provide considerable support for MTAC analysts if the proper information can be 
made available.   
 
The major ASOCC drawbacks for supporting MTAC activities are:  
1.  lack of capability to support TS/SCI information and  
2.  it will be available only to major commands.   
Thus, much of the information used by MTAC cannot be on the system and it cannot be used for 
widespread information dissemination to the naval community.   
 
The existence of ASOCC in MTAC opens the possibility of close collaboration with those units 
participating in HLS, including real-time assessments and C2 during a terrorist event.  This 
would be a major addition to MTAC responsibilities, but could be warranted as DoD becomes 
increasingly involved in this activity.   
· ASOCC would provide the capabilities needed for this mission.  
· Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) would have to be written for supporting this 
mission, and for using ASOCC in conjunction current information processes.      
 
 
1.2 CORRELATION BETWEEN ASOCC DESIGN and MTAC PROCESSES 
 
MTAC and NCIS Field Agents have responsibilities for: 
· Providing assessments to naval units.   
· Collaboration with other agencies to develop assessments.  
· Collaboration with Operations Centers.  
· Interaction with local authorities for naval unit Force Protection.  
 




ASOCC is designed to provide information for the following operational and tactical actions:   
· Collaborative course-of-action planning.  
· Crisis and Consequence Management execution.  
· Situation monitoring.  
· Response asset monitoring.   
· ID through engagement of specific threat objects. 
The system uses an internet based approach, with considerable graphic display and collaboration 
capabilities .  It is designed for real- time information during a terrorist event, primarily for Crisis 
and Consequence Management. 
 
ASOCC provides information input, access, display, and dissemination, and collaboration for 
decision-making.  MTAC's principal activities are similar processes.   
· ASOCC's collaboration capabilities could improve the workflow of both MTAC 
watchstanders and analysts.  
· ASOCC's capability to display large amounts of diverse information for easy 
comprehension could aid MTAC near-term and real-time analyses. 
 
The ASOCC CONOPS specifically address requirements for, and the system has solutions for: 
speed of information access,  
information fusion (presentation for fusion, not the process),  
situation assessment,  
widespread information dissemination, and  
speed of collaboration.   
· The system fully meets these requirements for real-time Consequence Management.   
 
ASOCC does not meet MTAC operations requirements for:  
· Automatic generation of Navy messages and/or e-mail. 
· Field Agent connectivity to SIPRNET when ASOCC is not available to them. 
· Availability at all naval units.  
· TS/SCI information sources and collaboration.  
 
The first two requirements could be accomplished within ASOCC with some additional system 
development.  The second two are unrealistic.  This implies  
· ASOCC cannot replace existing MTAC process means.  It would have to work in parallel 
with them.   
· This is not a serious restriction.  Regardless of the support provided by the system, the 
requirement to use existing means will remain.   
 
 
1.3 ASOCC USE FOR MTAC PROCESSES SPECIFICS 
 
Providing Assessments to Naval Units:  MTAC has the responsibility to provide a variety of 
assessments and warnings to naval units, ranging from Threat Assessments to Blue Darts.   
· ASOCC can provide a distribution means to those units that have the system.  
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· Current means, primarily message traffic, will continue to be required. 
· Having parallel means for distribution is an advantage.  Redundant paths will be needed 
when one path is unavailable.   
 
Collaboration With Other Agencies To Develop Assessments:  A significant portion of MTAC's 
information input comes from other agencies.  Most of this information is at the TS/SCI level.   
· ASOCC cannot support information nor collaboration at the TS/SCI level. 
· ASOCC Chat collaboration tools at the Secret level would benefit assessment operations.  
 
Collaboration With Operations Centers:  MTAC currently coordinates with a number of centers, 
e.g. ROCs, JITTF.  This is currently done to both obtain and provide threat information.   
· AOCC will be at many centers and can implement instant, multi-person collaboration for 
operational and tactical purposes.  
· Assessments could be speeded with use of the system. 
· Availability of side-by-side Secret and Unclassified collaboration could aid fusing both 
types of information.  
 
Interaction With Local Authorities:  I&W and real-time Force Protection information can come 
from a variety of sources, including unclassified such as local police or even civilians.  Current 
NCIS interaction with local authorities is primarily through Field Agents and Field Offices.   
· ASOCC being located in EOCs could speed access to local threat information.  
· Field agents will most often not have direct access to the system.  
· Local information is filtered through a Field Office (first- level assessment by subject-
matter experts), which will not have ASOCC.   
· There is no process for direct MTAC access to locally produced information.  
· It is unclear how local information, vetted for assessment, would be placed in ASOCC, 
when, and by whom.   
 
ID Through Engagement Of Specific Threat Objects:  ASOCC has capabilities to identify and 
track threat objects and to distribute that information.  Tracking such objects in real-time is not 
an MTAC responsibility, but it is an MTAC responsibility to monitor and assess the threat 
environment and knowledge of anything that contributes to that environment is of high interest.   
· ASOCC's presentation of threat tracks could aid assessing the threat environment.  
· ASOCC may not be in operation and presenting tracks during the pre-event phase.   
 
Field Agents:  NCIS Field Agents will probably not have access to ASOCC.  Agents are an 
important source of information, both I&W and real-time.  They also provide information 
directly to ships and installations and play a key role in overseas ship Force Protection.  Because 
of these responsibilities, and their possible need for rapid communications, consideration must be 
given to how they carry out their duties when ASOCC is in use.   
· There are no means determined for Agents inputting information to ASOCC.   
· There are no processes for ASOCC distribution of SIRs and Spot Reports.   
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1.4 RECOMMENDED ACTIONS  
 
Parallel Paths:  The requirement to disseminate information from MTAC to naval forces via 
message traffic will remain regardless of other means being put into place.  E-mail is also 
extensively used for alerting.  If ASOCC and existing means are to operate in parallel: 
· Single-point-entry is needed. 
· If there is no automatic means for creating messages and e-mail from single-point-entry, 
the amount of work to be done in MTAC will be increased by inclusion of ASOCC paths.  
Benefits to MTAC from having the ASOCC path also available are:  
· Use of ASOCC and associated alerting could speed the information processes.   
· Availability of ASOCC could provide an alternate path when current means are down.   
 
Personnel Requirements:   ASOCC manning requirements are unclear.  Manning depends on 
how it will be used.  It is expected that decisions on how ASOCC will be used will depend on 
whether needed manning can be supported.  
· Determine ASOCC manning requirements for various use configurations.  
o Full 24/7 support for MTAC daily operations.  
o Support for only new HLS operations.  
o Use of the collaboration capabilities for daily analyst operations.  
o Use of the collaboration capabilities by watchstanders.  
 
System Improvements, Fusion of Real-Time and I&W Information:  Pre-terrorist-event I&W 
information can be valuable for evaluating the current situation.  This could be information 
acquired and processed for as long as several months before an event.  Such information needs to 
be fused with that obtained during the event.  There is no ASOCC process for doing this. 
· Develop a means for ASOCC fusion of long-term I&W information.  
o A permanent archive. 
o A classification scheme so that pertinent information can be identified.  
o A means for extracting information that applies to the current situation. 
o A means for displaying information that applies to the current situation.  
· Develop SOP for fusing I&W and current event information for real-time analysis. 
 
System Improvements, Alerting Naval Units to Threats:  The current alerting system in ASOCC 
needs modification and additional capabilities: 
· A means to go directly from an alert to pertinent information.  
· Visible alert status for the sender, e.g. has it been opened and acted on.  
· Visual time of entry and status for all ASOCC users 
· Prioritization scheme.  
· Direct alert to the recipient for directed information.  
· A separate special section for official information, such as SAR, SIR, Blue Dart.   
 
SOP Development:  The current ASOCC CONOPS and contained SOPs are fairly complete for 
Crisis and Consequence Management.  They do not address many MTAC requirements.   
· Develop new MTAC SOPs  
o For use of ASOCC in parallel with current means for current processes. 
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o HLS responsibilities. 
· Develop ASOCC SOPs specific to how it provides NCIS support.   
o For placing SIRs, Spot Reports, SARs, etc. in ASOCC.  
o Field Agent access and use.  
 
 
1.5  ASOCC IN A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS     
 
No single current system is designed to support the broad spectrum of information processes 
from MTAC's I&W to terrorist-event real-time sensors and C2.  A combination of systems, 
preferably existing systems, is needed.    
 
The Navy currently has systems that, collectively, can meet many requirements, with ASOCC 
adding the needed COP and SA at the local level.  For example: 
· Joint Fires Network (JFN) 
· Tactical Exploitation System- Navy (TES-N) 
· Collaboration at Sea (CaS)  
· Global Command and Control System (GCCS) 
These are noted (there are others) as examples because the first two support Navy Fires and the 
last two provide access throughout the Fleets.  Navy Fires processes have correspondence to 
HLS processes and Navy Force Protection operations.  Compatibility of ASOCC with JFN 
would be needed and is not technically difficult.  
 
Much of MTAC's information and collaboration is at the TS/SCI level.  If network solutions are 
to be used for information dissemination at the Secret level, a means is needed to move 
information between these levels.  JFN includes TES-N (TS/SCI) for image exploitation and 
ADOCS (SECRET/NOFORN) for target execution.   
· TES-N processes TS/SCI information and passes Secret target information to ADOCS for 
target explo itation.   
· TES-N can also pass information to GCCS for situational awareness.   
Thus, technical solutions for the exchange of information across classification levels exist.  It is 
germane that 
· ASOCC has capabilities for import of information from GCCS. 
 
The need to provide information to all naval units is a significant consideration for any system 
supporting MTAC operations.  ASOCC will not be available at all locations with which MTAC 
is required to exchange information.  Most challenging are small ships at sea, which have 
intermittent internet connectivity and limited bandwidth.  The CaS system exists on essentially 
all Navy ships.  Updates by replication occur frequently, with files being updated whenever a 
ship logs on.   
· CaS is not directly compatible with ASOCC, JFN, or its variants and it would be 
somewhat cumbersome to use for this application without modifications.   
· However, it illustrates that network solutions to widespread distribution are available 
without starting from scratch.   
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2.0  INTRODUCTION  
 
The purpose of the study reported here is to determine contributions the Area Security 
Operational Command and Control (ASOCC) system can make to the mission of the Multi-
Threat Alert Center (MTAC) and to its parent organization, the Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service (NCIS).   We focus on MTAC and NCIS Field Agents because ASOCC has, potentially, 
the most direct applicability to their operations.   
 
It is planned that ASOCC will be installed at Homeland Security (HLS) operating centers and at 
major Navy facilities such as Regional Operating Centers.  An ASOCC server is already located 
in MTAC but there are no CONOPS or Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for how it will be 
used.  The ASOCC developer has written Draft CONOPS that can provide an initial review of 
the support that can be expected for MTAC information processes and collaboration with other 
organizations.  This is not an evaluation of ASOCC capabilities, rather the support it can provide 
to MTAC’s mission.  
 
The ASOCC CONOPS states (italics) that the current, draft version “exclusively focuses on Navy 
employment and, in particular, the current Phase 1 employment strategy (e.g. San Diego and 
Norfolk fleet concentration areas).”  Thus, the CONOPS is appropriate to Navy use at operating 
centers that support a regions installations.  This is not necessarily the same support needed for 
MTAC's mission to provide assessments for the whole of naval forces.   
 
Perhaps the first organizations MTAC will interact with that have ASOCC installations are East 
and West Coast Joint Harbor Operating Centers (JHOCs), which are primarily combined Navy 
and Coast Guard organizations.  A Draft CONOPS for the San Diego JHOC has been prepared.  
That CONOPS has been reviewed as part of this study.    
 
During a crisis event appropriate Emergency Operating Centers (EOC) are stood up to manage 
the situation.  Their operations and how MTAC will operate with them are an important 
consideration.  MIDLANT Regional Operating Center (ROC) personnel have been interviewed 
in order to understand how MTAC now interacts with that Center and how it might interact 
through the use of ASOCC.   
 
A primary ASOCC goal is to provide shared Situational Awareness (SA) amongst local 
organizations and between them and national organizations during an emergency.  For this 
purpose it is planned to have the system at local-, regional-, and national- level EOCs.  NCIS 
Field Agents duties include interaction with a variety of people and organizations at the local 
level as well as their being a part of NCIS operations at the Field Office level.  There is the 
possibility that access to ASOCC would enhance Field Agent interaction with local organizations 
and with MTAC.  Thus, Field Agent processes are included in report as a component in 
understanding potential ASOCC use.   
 
Three general types of information exchange must be considered: 
 1.  Long-range Indications and Warning (I&W). 
 2.  Urgent information that needs assessment and fusion with other information.  
 3.  Immediate threats.   
 




The first type of information is processed and transmitted at a relatively slow pace.  Building 
Threat Assessments is an example.  Most information that is dealt with by the intelligence 
community is of this type.  Multi-agency collaboration for evaluation and producing products is 
frequent.   
 
The second type of information is less frequent but of high priority when it appears.  It requires 
in-depth evaluation in order to assess the level of the threat.  It can lead to an assessment of 
imminent danger and warnings to units that might be affected must be sent out.   
 
For the third type, by immediate threat we mean information is in hand that “the Huns are 
coming over the hill”.  The information is such that immediate action is required.  NCIS deals 
with this type of information infrequently.  It is this type of information ASOCC is designed to 
carry, information that produces situational awareness during a terrorist event for both Crisis and 
Consequence Management.    
 
This report does not provide a complete presentation of all NCIS information processes.  As 
noted above, the purpose of this report is to determine what ASOCC can contribute to MTAC 
processes and the processes described are only as complete as needed for this purpose.  Even 
with this restriction, a considerable breadth of information exchange processes is covered.   
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3.0  FITNESS ANALYSIS  
 
Determining support that ASOCC can provide for MTAC processes is done by determining 
“fitness” between that system's capabilities and MTAC's information input and dissemination 
requirements.  Fitness is multivariate, requiring examining several aspects of both the system and 
requirements.  We have developed a set of elements to facilitate this comparison.  They are: 
· Broad purpose, objectives  
· Who participates  
· High- level functions  
· Operational/tactical actions   
· Command and personnel relationships 
· System/process requirements  
· System/process capabilities  
 
Fitness comparisons of the type reported here are best made at the Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) and Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) level.  The ASOCC Draft 
CONOPS contains many SOPs and TTPs even though they are not identified as such.   
 
For a Fitness comparison, each element is broken down into a set of attributes, which are shown 
in the following table.  The table then shows whether that attribute is required by MTAC and 
provided by ASOCC.  There are two columns for MTAC, the first for current requirements and 
the second for MTAC expanding its mission to fully support HLS.  Fitness between MTAC and 
ASOCC is determined by looking for Xs in the same rows.  Fitness is higher for MTAC 
transitioning to HLS support because ASOCC was designed for such support.     
 
  MTAC   MTAC 
Fitness Element Current ASOCC HLS 
Broad Purpose       
Indications and Warnings X   X 
Multi-Agency Situational Awareness  X X 
Multi-Agency COA Planning  X   
Threat Assessment X   X 
Incident Management   X   
Participants      
NORTHCOM X X X 
JITTF X   X 
ROC  X X 
EOC  X   
JHOC  X X 
Local Law Enforcement  X   
First Responders  X   
Field Offices X   X 
Field Agents X   X 
Navy Bases X X X 
Ships X   X 
High-Level Functions      
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Collaborative COA Planning  X   
Crisis Management  X X 
Consequence Management  X   
Operational Situational Awareness X X X 
Tactical Situational Awareness  X X 
Threat Asssessment X   X 
Threat Warnings X X X 
Operational/Tactical Actions      
Asset Monitoring  X   
Asset Management  X   
Detect to Engage  X   
Sensor Management  X   
Information Management X X X 
Information Alerting X X X 
Action Alerting X X X 
Tactical Collaboration   X X 
System Requirements/Capabilities      
Internet Based  X X 
Message Traffic X   X 
Collaboration Capabilities X X X 
TS/SCI Capable X   X 
Secret Level Capable X X X 
Unclassified Capable X X X 
Automatic Trans -Classification    X 
Connectivity to All Bases X   X 
Connectivity to All Ships X   X 
Connectivity to Field Offices X   X 
Field Agent Accessible X   X 
Ingest Sensor Data  X   
Map Overlays  X X 
Import Agency Databases  X X 
WMD/HAZMAT Predictions  X   
Incident Reporting  X X 
Warning Direction and Coordination  X X 
Threat Warning X X X 
 
Discussions of these attributes are found throughout this report.  Discussions of the Fitness 
elements are found in the Conclusions in Section 8.   
 
Summary Fitness between MTAC requirements and ASOCC capabilities, using aggregate 
elements are as follows:  
Aggregate Element       Fitness 
Intelligence Agency collaboration    Low 
Reach all naval units       Low 
Coordination with Operations Centers   High 
Real-time situation awareness (MTAC with HLS)   High 
Real-time threat alerting     High  
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4.  MTAC PROCESSES AND REQUIREMENTS   
 
MTAC's primary duty is threat reporting from I&W information.  Information comes from CIA, 
State, FBI, other DoD, and Navy sources.  Information comes in on JWICS and CT Link, which 
is operated by the CIA.  These are TS/SCI sources and normally contain raw information.  CT 
Link is the primary source and CIA controls its content.  The Watch Officer checks these inputs 
every 15 min and determines whether there is information that requires action, decides what 
action to take, and initiates the proper processes.   
 
Information also comes into MTAC from NCIS Field Agents, field offices, ships, and other 
Navy units.  The MTAC information situation presents an interesting challenge.  The 
organization is to ingest information that has a wide range of attributes, ingest, fuse, and assess 
it, and provide information outputs with a similarly wide range of attributes.  Attributes are: 
 Geographic  -specific location to broadly applicable. 
 Time   -immediate interest to uncertain time of threat action. 
 Quality  -highly credible to unknown veracity; - recent to aged information.  
 Level   - severe threat to generalized danger.   
 
If a piece of information comes into MTAC that is  
· credible 
· immediate interest (e.g., near-term threat) 
· location known 
· significant danger 
the watch will take immediate  action to warn the affected unit through appropriate means.   
 
If these criteria are not met, different actions can be taken.  E.g., [General interest, not imminent 
> send to analyst and archive]   or   [Significant threat, unknown location > general alert]. 
 
The situation is often not clear-cut and nor from a single piece of information.  It is often one of 
piecing together information that has a range of attributes, some separated in time, and possibly 
from a location that is not that where the current threat exists.  One of the main functions of 
MTAC analysts is to fuse information from many sources to build a coherent threat picture and 
provide appropriate warnings.   
 
Fusing dissimilar types of information to present an accurate picture of a current threat is 
challenging.  For example, say the following information were available: 
 1.  A terrorist group X had received scuba training on underwater demolition  
     techniques at a camp within the last year (information in an archive).   
2.  Local dissidents at port city Y recently purchased scuba gear (Field Agent report).  
3.  Van of unknown ownership intercepted bringing explosives Port Y country.    
4.  Local contacts report excitement within local dissidents about an approaching event  
     (recent information obtained from friendly by agent arranging a port visit). 
5.  A U.S. DDG is planning a Port Y visit in two weeks.   
The sources for this information are varied, the contents are of various ages, and different means 
were used for their transmission to MTAC.  They need to be fused into a coherent picture. 
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What information should MTAC output, and to whom, based on these inputs?  It could be:  
a general warning of underwater threats to all Navy units.  
an increase in threat level for that country and modified Threat Assessment. 
a specific warning to the DDG not to go into port A. 
a combination of the above.   
 
In this contrived situation it is easy to see correlations between various pieces of information.  
For many of the situations being examined it is not so easy.  It is NCIS's/MTAC's job to piece 
together information and provide outputs to the Navy that enable adequate Force Protection 
postures.  A thrust of this project is to determine what types of information systems are needed to 
accomplish this job in the current and future environments.   
 
There is an urgency spectrum to both information input and output.  They can roughly be 
categorized as: 
 Long-range - used with other information to build assessments. 
 Timely - forward to Navy units and other organizations for their consideration. 
 Urgent - immediate threat knowledge or belief, issue appropriate warnings.  
 
 
4.1  LONG-RANGE I&W INFORMATION  
 
The MTAC watch is continually monitoring input information from a variety of sources.  
Information for which immediate action is not needed is sent to analysts, placed in "folders", and 
used to prepare briefings.  Such information is also shared with other intelligence agencies and 
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Much of the input information is on the high side, TS/SCI.  If classified (Secret) information is 
sent out, it is put on a disk and taken to a computer with the proper classification.  If needed, 
voice is by STU.   
 
Collaboration paths are not shown.  IRC Chat is available on the high side.  Secret level Chat is 
not available and would be useful for many situations.   
 
 
4.2   TIME-SENSITIVE INFORMATION FLOW   
 
The following figure shows examples of time-sensitive information flow.  It is a composite of the 


























Time-Sensitive Information Flow 
 
 
Message traffic is currently the primary means of transmitting information.   
 
Nothing above indicates the speed with which various types of information should be accessed, 
evaluated, and transmitted.  Message traffic is slow, and phone calls are also subject to 
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An evaluation of speed requirements is beyond the scope of this study, except to indicate in the 
comparisons with ASOCC where it might be a factor. 
 
 
4.3 ANALYST PROCESSES  
 
MTAC Analysts have available information from several sources.  Their source of criminal 
information is MARS.  They can pull information from there or the Watch may push information 
to them.  They are experts for a particular geographical area and subscribe to daily summaries 
that pertain to that area.  E.g., for the Pacific area: JIC/PAC, PACOM, NSA/East Asia.  
JITTF/CT would be a source for all analysts.  Analysts also have available information that is 
archived at NCIS, and area information “drawers” are being implemented.   
 
Analysts also work directly with the NCIS Field Office for their area.  This is done through e-
mail and phone calls.  In some cases a Field Office does not have communication facilities for 
high classification levels and information has to be transmitted through an embassy.  E-mail is 
used for asynchronous group-chat and a SIPR internet capability to carry out collaboration would 
be of benefit.   
 
In the course of producing their product, Analysts acquire and evaluate a broad range of 
information and participate in quite a bit of collaboration.  Most Analyst output is SARs but they 
can also produce Spot reports.  They can send a SAR with no other endorsement.  The following 
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4.3.1 Threat Assessments  
Producing Threat Assessments is a new task for MTAC Analysts.  The information used to 
produce these assessments is obtained in the same manner as noted above, with a focus on 
piecing together various types of information, mainly long-term, to provide a complete picture.   
 
Assessments are coordinated with the appropriate field office using the process illustrated in the 
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5.  FIELD AGENT PROCESSES AND REQUIREMENTS 
 
NCIS Field Agents have a wide range of law enforcement responsibilities, few of which are 
covered here.  We have chosen to focus on those responsibilities that illustrate types of 
information exchange where ASOCC can provide and not provide support:   
1.  Interaction with Operations Centers  
2.  Interaction with MTAC 
3.  Foreign port operations 
 
Interactions with Operations Centers and with MTAC are similar in that they are multi-person 
activities.  Agents on the ground coordinate with their Field Office.  The Field Office has agents 
assigned to coordinate with regional Operations Centers.  It also has an administrative center 
where communications with outside the office are cleared, prioritized, and executed.  Foreign 
port operations are different because the Field Agent has more individual information exchange 
responsibilities, e.g. communications with a ship while it is in port.   
 
NCIS Field Agents are not authorized to provide information directly to other units.  The Agent 
uses an authorization process at Field Headquarters, which involves a supervisor and the 
administration message center.  If the information will go to an Operations Center, the NCIS 
agent assigned as coordinator with the Center will also be involved.  Regardless of whether 
information goes to a Center, a coincident path to Navy units will also be used.  The following is 
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5.1 FOREIGN PORT OPERATIONS 
 
Foreign ports vary widely in the capabilities that are available.  We discuss here the worst case 
so that the full range of communications options used and needed are discussed.  It can be the 
case that there is no embassy available, no NCIS support facilities, no communication other than 
by cell phone.  This does not directly address evaluation of ASOCC use in the continental U.S., 
but does provide additional insight into the full range of NCIS communication needs ASOCC 
may need to support.   
 
We describe the common situation of an Agent supporting a Navy ship going into a foreign port.  
Before leaving the home station for the foreign location, the Agent takes the following actions: 
· Pull the current Threat Assessment for the area.   
· Pull the current PIVA for the location.   
· Check out a cell phone that will work in the area.  
· Obtain the ship’s Force Protection Plan.   
If  lucky, they may have the Force Protection Plan before leaving the office.  Getting the Plan 2 
weeks ahead is a wonder, may get it 2 days ahead, or it may not be available until in- transit or on 
site.     
 
On site, the agent’s first actions are: 
· Contact the Defense Attaché. 
· Contact the ship.   
If there are difficulties reaching the ship because of local conditions, the home Station is 
contacted to have them relay information to the ship.  When the ship is in port:  
· Deliver the Threat Assessment personally to the ship’s Commanding Officer and Force 
Protection Officer.   
· Meet with the ship daily to communicate updates and, if the ship desires, participate in 
daily planning.   
 
Prior to the ship’s arrival, and while it is in port, the Agent is: 
· Working with local law enforcement to assess threats and available local support. 
· Working with local information sources, if such contacts exist.  
· Working with the port administration to determine facilities support available.  
· Comparing the ship’s Force Protection Plan to current conditions. 
· Communicating needed information updates to the ship, its superior, and the home office.  
The result is that the Agent spends much time on-the-ground and may have a need to 
communicate from various locations.  Communications can be with all of the entities noted 
above.  The Agent's primarily communication means are:  
· Phone.  
· Face-to-face.   
 
The need to communicate sensitive or classified information often arises and this can be delayed 
until proper facilities can be reached.  NCIS is in the process of acquiring RASP, a portable 
computer system that will allow secure communications by satellite link from any location.    
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The work described above is a mixture of real-time coordination and longer-term situation 
assessment.  Being successful at assessing the local situation requires developing local 
relationships so that information sources are available.  During an “event”, on-the-street 
activities must still occur if the Agent is to be effective. 
  
ASOCC will not play a role in foreign operations because it will not be available.  Several 
systems with similar capabilities are being proposed for HLS.  The Navy is improving its ability 
to collaborate during operational situations by various means, such as Joint Fires Network, 
Collaboration at Sea, Global Command and Control System.  A spectrum of capabilities is in 
place, being improved, and becoming available.   It is important to examine whether a similar 
tool would be of benefit to an Agent for foreign operations.  In essence, one is asking whether a 
tool developed for real-time situation awareness during an event, and in the ASOCC case 
designed to meet the needs of first responders and consequence managers, will be of aid to 
Agents longer-term operations.   
 
Field Agent operations in CONUS are similar to those described above so this question also 
applies to CONUS activities.  A significant difference is that communication capabilities are 
better.  Another difference is that working with local authorities is more reliable and smoother.   
 
The position of an NCIS Field Agent in CONUS is unlike other law enforcement officers 
because they are part of DoD and laws with regard to the military operating in the U.S. apply.  
The Agent can work low-level civilian sources but can’t investigate U.S. citizens; that is an FBI 
responsibility and such information has to be obtained from them.  They provide a support role 
during an event to base security forces and local police, who have the primary responsibility.  
For example, during an event, an agent might provide near-term information to gates for the type 
of activity to expect, but would not be responsible for manning the gates and protecting the base.  
In essence the responsibilities are somewhat longer-range predictions.  An agent is unlikely to 
need the speed of an ASOCC for communicating such information.    
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6.  JHOC FUNCTIONS  
 
JHOC is included here because of the emerging importance of Homeland Security (HLS) and 
because JHOC San Diego being stood up, with NCIS participation, as an HLS center.  It is also 
important because it is a prototype for Navy participating in direct coordination with other 
activities during a crisis event, i.e. Navy Region, U.S. Coast Guard, base security, local law 
enforcement, City EOC, etc.   
 
Interactions with JHOC depend on how that organization functions.  Pertinent JHOC 
characteristics are:  
· Manned full-time to manage harbor operations.   
· Exists within the Coast Guard Operating Center. 
· Three watchstanders: Coast Guard, Navy, and Harbor Police. 
· NCIS Agent will be assigned to JHOC (for coordination, not as a watchstander). 
· Navy OS/E5 will be in the EOC permanently to monitor IWCCS.  
· Will contain an ASOCC terminal.   
 
The JHOC situation awareness architecture is complex.  Characteristics of this architecture 
pertinent to this study are: 
· Multi-node, with sensor inputs at various places. 
o Harbor cameras feed into SPAWAR EOC and Regional Police EOC.   
o IWCCS feed to ASOCC will be in CG EOC (at JHOC). 
o GCCS will feed into IWCCS (I&W tracks) then be fed into ASOCC for C2.  
· ASOCC is the backbone that will distribute sensor imagery and information.  
o An ASOCC terminal will be needed at SW Region to input these feeds.   
o Bases will need an ASOCC node of security is to have this information. 
This architecture means that information from a variety of sensors in the harbor area can be 
available to all area participants, and to remote locations properly equipped.  The same is true for 
any other type of information exchange.  
 
The architecture makes possible single point-of-entry for information an NCIS Field Agent 
wishes to provide to NCIS, the Navy Region, law enforcement, etc.  Even though JHOC will be 
in operation all of the time, the same is not true for other centers.  They will be in operation 
during a crisis, with a defined process for which center is primary, with an alternate primary in 
case one is down.  The following considerations apply to whether or not an Agent can use this 
system for transmitting information to required locations:  
· Some units requiring the information may not have ASOCC capabilities. 
· The system may not be manned (non-crisis situations).  
· It may not be desired to give the information widespread distribution.   
 
We provide here a review of the Draft JHOC CONOPS as a baseline to compare how MTAC can 
coordinate with that organization and how ASOCC might be part of that process.  This is not a 
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6.1 JHOC CONOPS ELEMENTS  
 
The 24 Mar Draft CONOPS (see Appendix B) contains all of the elements outlined in the Fitness 
Analysis Methodology Section, but not arranged as shown there.  The following are elements 
extracted from that document and placed in the suggested arrangement.  These elements are not 
described for the sake of brevity and because the meanings are well understood.   
 
Broad purpose, objective    
· Improve common Situational Awareness and responsiveness across multi-agencies.   
· Improve C2 and coordination of multi-agency efforts to deter, detect and defend against 
asymmetrical terrorist threats offshore and within the Port of San Diego. 
· Enhance coordination of Incident Management and Consequence Management.  
· Leverage collective efforts and limited resources to optimize their use.  
· Enable coordinated interagency actions. 
 
Who participates  
· United States Coast Guard, San Diego Operations Center 
· Commander, Naval Region South West, Emergency Operations Center 
· Commander, Third Fleet 
 
High- level functions supported  
· Collaborative course-of-action planning   
· Situation analysis   
· Crisis and Consequence Management execution 
· Situation monitoring   
· Response asset readiness monitoring 
· Destroy/thwart asymmetric threats  
 
Operational/tactical actions supported  
· Identify 
· Track  
· Target 
· Interdict 
· Engage and re-engage  
 
Command and personnel relationships 
· One watchstander from each participating organization 
· Two options for authority: 
o JHOC Watch Commander has assigned coordination authority 
o All watchstanders equal 
 
Use rules  
· Participating agencies will retain Tactical Control (TACON) of their assets.   
· Participating agencies operate under their existing ROE.  
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· Diverting USN assets should be avoided to ensure continuous protection of vessels and 
facilities. 
· Requests for USCG assets will go directly to the Activities Operations Duty Officer. 
· Requests for Harbor Police assets will go directly to Harbor Police Dispatch.  
· Requests for Navy Security assets will go directly to Regional Dispatch Center EOC.  
 
System/process requirements  
· Timely 
· Interoperability within the Incident Command System 
· Information architecture 
o server-based intranet link to integrate  
§ sensors,  
§ agency databases,  
§ intelligence information  
· Databases 
o National Criminal Information Center (NCIC)    
o Automated Regional Justice Information System (ARJIS)  
o Marine Information Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE)  
o Joint Maritime Information Element (JMIE), SEALINK, ELINT query   
o Global Command and Control System Marine/Joint(GCCS-M/J)   
 
System/process capabilities  
· Interoperable secure communications 






· Geographically separated sensors 
· Static information sources (dynamic is not mentioned)   
· Sensors 
o video  
o radar  
o thermal imaging  
o sonar  
o ACTD Direction Finding System (position localization)  
o Automatic Identification System (AIS)  
o Blue Force Locating System 
 
 
6.2 JHOC TASKS   
 
The Draft CONOPS lists a large number of tasks in its Section III, “Concept of Operations”.  
These tasks are breakdowns of the elements listed above into actual activities to be performed.  
For example, the following tasks listed under A, “Daily Operations”, are Track tasks: 
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    Track 
#2  Monitor, track and record deep draft vessel traffic including moored and anchored vessels. 
#3  Monitor and track other vessel activity for suspicious and/or anomalous activity. 
#8  Compare actual vessel arrival information with scheduled arrival information. 
#10  Establish, maintain dialogue with local pilots associations concerning vessel movements. 
#12  Maintain continuous MDA (commercial vessels in port, cargo operations, Blue Force 
activities, channel clearings, special events, HVA/HIVs, and boardings).  
 
In order to compare adequately JHOC CONOPS and MTAC information processes, it is 
necessary look at tasks as well as the CONOPS elements.  In Results, Section 8, we discuss 
correlations between CONOPS elements and tasks and MTAC processes.   
 
The JHOC CONOPS contains a large number of tasks that are not included in the elements listed 
above.  A number of them overlap with MTAC responsibilities.   A list follows immediately with 
code numbers (A1, B1b, etc) that refer to the subsection and number in Section III “Concept of 
Operations”  
A1 – Maintain situational awareness of current activities.  
A4 – Receive and coordinate initial investigations of suspicious and/or anomalous 
activities. 
A5 – Monitor radios for voice traffic.   
A3 – Monitor and track other vessel activity for suspicious and/or anomalous activity.   
A12 – Maintain continuous MDA of Blue Force activities, special events, HVAs, and 
boardings. 
A16 – Respond to requests for information from federal, state, and local authorities.  
B1b – Divert/launch the most appropriate law enforcement asset(s) to investigate or 
intercept threats/targets of interest. 
B1c – Alert all participating agencies threats/targets of interest.  
B1f – Requests for Navy Security assets will go directly to the Regional Dispatch Center. 
B1g – All participating agencies will agree to comply with JHOC requests whenever 
feasible.  
B1j – Provide tactical coordination between available law enforcement and protective 
(USN Force Protection) assets.  
B5 – Coordinate information dissemination to appropriate commands and stakeholders.  
D1 – Utilize an informational technology architecture that will integrate sensors, agency 
databases, and intelligence information to provide common situational awareness for 
decision-makers and security assets… 
 
This is an interesting list.  It ranges from information dissemination that is clearly within the 
MTAC area of responsibility (B1c), to how NCIS Field Agents might be assigned (B1g), to new 
coordination tasks (D1).  There is, as yet, no indication of how these tasks would be shared 
between MTAC and a JHOC.  This needs to be clarified as SOP are developed for all phases of 
terrorist events.   
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7.  ASOCC CAPABILITIES 
 
The Draft ASOCC CONOPS is contained in Appendix A.  It presents good descriptions of 
system components and capabilities in the initial sections, which are not discussed here.  Rather, 
we discuss proposed use of the system to support HLS processes.  System performance is 
adequate to support this use.  System improvement suggestions are in Section 8 of this report.   
 
 
7.1 ASOCC CONOPS ELEMENTS  
 
The 12 May ASOCC Draft CONOPS contains all the elements presented above in Section 3, but 
not arranged in the manner shown there.  The following are elements extracted from that 
document and placed in the desired arrangement.  The entries are not described for the sake of 
brevity and because the meanings are well understood.   
 
Broad Purpose, Objective    
In the section "Coordination/Support, Command and Control Strategy", the CONOPS states 
"...provide commanders with mission-critical capabilities to plan, coordinate, integrate and 
manage AT/FP operations by integrating the efforts of the Joint Maritime Component 
Commander (JFMCC), CPF/CLF, C2F/C3F, other U.S. Combatant Commanders, Navy 
Regional Commanders, U.S. Coast Guard activities, and local/State/Federal law enforcement 
partners".  This breaks down into the following objectives: 
· Provide common Situational Awareness across multi-agencies.   
· Provide collaborative course-of-action planning across multi-agencies. 
· Provide cooperative decision-making across multi-agencies 
· Provide a platform for threat assessment, operational and tactical support, and response to 
the presence of WMD devices during all aspects of a terrorist incident including both 
crisis and consequence management. 
 
Who Participates  
The CONOPS defines two organization levels: Incident Level is first responders and Multi-
Echelon Level is the collection of organizations that provide screened information to responders 
and command organizations.  They contain: 
Incident Level: 
· Joint Harbor Operations  Center 
· Emergency Operations Center 
· Joint Operations Center  
· Navy Regional Command Center or Navy Regional Operations Center 
Multi-Echelon Level 
· US NORTHCOM/ECH 1 Commands/LFA 
· NAVNORTH/JFMCC 
· CPF/CLF  
 
High-Level Functions Supported   
· Collaborative course-of-action planning   
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· Crisis and Consequence Management execution 
· Situation monitoring   
· Response asset readiness monitoring 
 
Operational/Tactical Actions Supported    
The following actions are specifically included.   
· Shared situational awareness 
· Information management 
o Unclassified and Secret 
o Transfer across classification levels  
o Push and pull as local situation and threat demands 
o Alerting to insure information awareness 
· Information fusion 
o Sensors 
o Intelligence (threat) 
o Real-time law enforcement 
o Asset availability 
The I&W phase of an operation is noted but the CONOPS does not provide specifically for it. 
 
These information processes directly support military and civilian actions to identify and 
interdict terrorist activities.  In military terms, the spectrum of these actions is:  
· Identify 
· Track  
· Target 
· Interdict 
· Engage and re-engage  
 
Command and  Personal Relationships    
No command relationships are specified.  The CONOPS states " Since ASOCC is a peer-to-peer 
network, allowing permissive/approved access to all users for information being assimilated on 
the net, the concept of a command and control process, with strict hierarchies for reporting and 
communication, is not entirely applicable.".  Thus, there is no way to specify how ASOCC fits 
within a command structure or supports structured interrelationships between organizations.  It is 
flat and whatever structure or relationships exist must be imposed external to ASOCC.   
 
Operational personnel are not listed.  Personnel needed for system operation are designated.  It is 
not specified at what locations these people are needed.  It would not be at each location where 
there is an ASOCC system, so the total number is uncertain.  The responsibilities of the two 
positions are:  
· System Administrator  
o Monitor the status of ASOCC nodes and adjust peer-to-peer relationships as required, 
o Provide Tier II maintenance support to ASOCC workstations in the AOR,  
o Maintain a database on the configuration and ASOCC software version at each node, 
o Perform or coordinate installation of new software releases, 
o Perform ASOCC user and local administrator training, 
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· Operations support  
o Configure the XIS tool to access locally designed and remote databases for all nodes 
in the AOR, 
o Assist all nodes in developing or modifying and sharing of local databases for 
ASOCC access, 
o Provide quality control for local databases used as sources for ASOCC, 
o Identify remote databases of interest to ASOCC users and arrange for ASOCC access 
to them, 
o Identify and demonstrate mapping sources that may be of interest to ASOCC users, 
o Assist ASOCC nodes in developing and sharing overlays, shape files, etc. that could 
be used in ASOCC,  
o Assist in the training of ASOCC users. 
 
 
7.2 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES    
 
The ASOCC CONOPS does not use the term Standard Operating Procedures.  Regardless, the 
document does contain a large number of what are essentially SOPs.  They specify operation of 
the system rather than interactions between command nodes as are often specified in SOPs.  
Even though they are not specifically operational, they provide insight into operational use of 
ASOCC.   
 
These SOPs are extensive, covering all aspects of ASOCC use, and are segmented in the 
CONOPS into Incident and Multi-Echelon levels.  There are so many SOPs that, for ease of 
presentation, we have additionally segmented them into four categories: 
Information Management,  
Situational Awareness,  
Sensor Information, and  
Information Display.   
There is some overlap between SOPs at the Incident and Multi-Echelon levels.  When that 
occurs, they are listed in both.   
 
Incident Level:  
Information Management 
· Information on events happening off base:  These will be entered into ASOCC by the 
federal, state and local agencies that maintain nodes, or reported via JOC channels. 
· At the incident level, both an Unclassified and a Classified (SIPR only) network would 
be maintained. 
· When other first responders have ASOCC, the fire department, disaster response group, 
or other designated incident- level organizations may be responsible for WMD event 
calculation and reporting in ASOCC. 
· The location and details of events and incidents with installation security implications:  
Using the Event Log on the eX-Panel, these log entries will be linked to locally 
developed, interactive (future capability) checklists to expedite the taking and logging of 
actions. 
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· Creation of incident reports in the ASOCC Event Log by JHOC/EOC personnel would 
provide a primary (“quicklook”) information summary for use by higher (e.g. multi-
echelon level) command elements.  
· Local and State agencies such as local police, harbor patrol, fire department, etc., would 
have input and access to the Unclassified network.   
 
Situational Awareness  
· Using this sensor network, along with inputs from security patrols and on-scene 
observers, JHOC/EOC watchstanders would maintain a tactical picture of the area of 
interest, whether it be at a specific base installation, harbor, or facility perimeter.   
· ASOCC watchstanders may choose to designate chat rooms for collaboration in the 
Defense Collaboration Tools Suite (DCTS) and specify the purpose for each room.  They 
can establish these chat rooms for constant monitoring and establish schedules for regular 
collaboration sessions involving key personnel or nodes.   
 
Sensor Information   
· Sensor feeds coming from Radar, CCTV, Thermal Imagers, etc., would be fed into the 
Unclassified terminals located at the JHOC, EOC, and RCC/ROC.   
 
Information Display    
· JHOC/EOC personnel would maintain database information on the location, identity and 
status of critical infrastructure and assets that is compatible with XIS (e.g. MS Access 
database or Oracle database) so that it can be displayed in XIS and shared with other 
users.    
· ASOCC watchstanders may locally create and use “overlays” for the tactical-picture 
graphic display showing base defense, FPCON, and contingency plans to aid in situation 
response. 
· If intelligence suggests the possibility of a WMD threat, or in response to an actual WMD 
event and/or industrial (HAZMAT) accident, ASOCC watchstanders would calculate and 
display graphic overlays of the estimated areas affected (using the CATS tool) and be 
responsible for reporting the incident in ASOCC.   
 
Multi-Echelon Level  
Information Management  
· DoD ASOCC workstations supporting this operational level will (generally) operate at 
classified security levels on the SIPRNET. 
· Incident information will be provided on incidents occurring on or near U.S. installations, 
and in the entire AOR, including information on the location and identification of critical 
infrastructure and assets, and off-base operations. 
· U.S forces at DoD installations will be the source of information for incidents occurring 
on or very near U.S. installations.   
· JOCs and various Federal, State, and local agencies will be the sources of information for 
incidents occurring in the non-DoD portions of the AOR.  Regional Operations Centers 
(ROCs) (via their bilateral cells) are where information derived from regional level 
organizations will be entered into ASOCC for dissemination to all echelons.   
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· Information on the locations and identities of critical infrastructure and assets are 
maintained by the installation Command Post or EOC.   
· Tactical type information originated on unclassified ASOCCs and in unclassified 
databases will migrate to the classified side at the JHOC/EOC or RCC/ROC.  Both need 
access to ASOCCs operating on unclassified and classified networks. 
· Using the CATS tool in ASOCC, installation security forces will initiate calculation of 
areas affected by HAZMAT/WMD and what predicted impact it will have on military 
and civilian centers.   
· Echelon one will maintain a list of recommended web sites in a file in the AOR room on 
DCTS and may specify sites that all nodes should monitor.  Any node may recommend 
additional sites containing useful information to the AOR.  
· Incident folder management: The initial incident reporting node should include the name 
and location of this folder in the incident event log entry as well as information on which 
collaboration room in DCTS will be the focal point for collaboration on the incident 
being reported. 
 
Situational Awareness   
· Echelons above the installation level will not normally need tactical information about 
on-base security forces.  Needed is general knowledge of security force location and 
composition in the AOR, particularly those earmarked to support U.S. installations and 
those protecting off-base infrastructure critical to U.S. operations.  ROCs, and JOCs will 
obtain this type of information from their counterparts, and enter it into local databases.  
· If a WMD event or industrial accident occurs in other regions, it is important to 
immediately promulgate all I&W information as a preventative measure against possible 
multiple attacks.  
· Status boards will be used for situational awareness. 
o  The Incident-Level will create and maintain status boards for information created at 
their level.  
o Summary status boards to be maintained at the regional level.  
o When U.S. forces are using civilian airfields and ports for HLS operations, the 
Service Component conducting the operations at that site will maintain status board 
and assessment information on those sites unless ASOCC connectivity with those 
locations can be attained, in which case the site will maintain them. 
o Initial implementation for sharing status board type information is for each 
installation to maintain status boards on its SIPRNET web site.   
 
Sensor Information  
· All raw sensor inputs are to be directed to the regional and/or functional workgroup 
servers within the “incident- level” and selectively “pushed” or “pulled” to any other 
functional group or ASOCC station within the network.   
 
Information Display  
· ASOCC does not come with maps pre-installed.  Each node must find and store maps that 
fit its needs from other sources.  
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· The echelon one will maintain information on recommended mapping sources and files 
of geo-registered images in folders in its DCTS AOR room for all to use.  Other nodes 
may add images to this list at any time.  
 
 
7.3 SYSTEM/PROCESS REQUIREMENTS   
 
Immediately below are information system requirements from the JHOC CONOPS review, 
showing requirements from the operations support point of view.  They are presented very 
abbreviated as a lead- in to the following ASOCC capabilities.   
· Timely 
· Interoperability within the Incident Command System 
· Information architecture 
o server-based intranet link to integrate  
§ sensors,  
§ agency databases,  
§ intelligence information  
· Databases 
o National Criminal Information Center (NCIC)    
o Automated Regional Justice Information System (ARJIS)  
o Marine Information Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE)  
o Joint Maritime Information Element (JMIE), SEALINK, ELINT query   
o Global Command and Control System Marine/Joint(GCCS-M/J)   
 
There are additional requirements to support MTAC processes.  
· TS/SCI 
· Dissemination to all navy units, including ships  
· Support parallel message traffic  
 
The JHOC CONOPS contains a large number of tasks that are not included in the elements listed 
above.  A number of them overlap with MTAC responsibilities.   A list follows immediately with 
code numbers (A1, B1b, etc) that refer to the subsection and number in Section III “Concept of 
Operations”  
A1 – Maintain situational awareness of current activities.  
A4 – Receive and coordinate initial investigations of suspicious and/or anomalous 
activities. 
A5 – Monitor radios for voice traffic.   
A3 – Monitor and track other vessel activity for suspicious and/or anomalous activity.   
A12 – Maintain continuous MDA of Blue Force activities, special events, HVAs, and 
boardings. 
A16 – Respond to requests for information from federal, state, and local authorities.  
B1b – Divert/launch the most appropriate law enforcement asset(s) to investigate or 
intercept threats/targets of interest. 
B1c – Alert all participating agencies threats/targets of interest.  
B1f – Requests for Navy Security assets will go directly to the Regional Dispatch Center. 
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B1g – All participating agencies will agree to comply with JHOC requests whenever 
feasible.  
B1j – Provide tactical coordination between available law enforcement and protective 
(USN Force Protection) assets.  
B5 – Coordinate information dissemination to appropriate commands and stakeholders.  
D1 – Utilize an informational technology architecture that will integrate sensors, agency 
databases, and intelligence information to provide common situational awareness for 
decision-makers and security assets… 
 
This is an interesting list.  It ranges from information dissemination that is clearly within the 
MTAC area of responsibility (B1c), to how NCIS Field Agents might be assigned (B1g), to new 
coordination tasks (D1).  There is, as yet, no indication of how these tasks would be shared 
between MTAC and a JHOC.  This needs to be clarified as SOP are developed for all phases of 
terrorist events.   
 
 
7.4 SYSTEM CAPABILITIES 
 
There is no ASOCC capability to link to TS/SCI information.  Thus, intelligence information 
references are limited to SECRET.   
  
The ASOCC CONOPS segments system and process capabilities into nine categories:  
· Sensor Integration  
· Assessment Information  
· Threat Condition Reporting  
· Warning Direction and Coordination  
· Incident Reporting  
· Collaboration  
· Maps  
· Web Site Monitoring  
· WMD Events and Industrial Action Situations.   
This segmentation is preserved below.   
 
Sensor Integration 
· Provide a C4ISR backbone for AT/FP plug-and-play sensor packages that can be 
changed, modified, or removed in a short period of time.   
· Provide space, common open architecture, and a common control system for these 
sensors.   
· Capability needed to selectively push or pull all raw sensor inputs to any other functional 
group within the “incident- level” or ASOCC station within the network.   
· Nodes on the network (e.g. regional Border Patrol, Customs, or other Non-DoD law-
enforcement organizations) be able to provide cueing information on contacts or areas of 
interest to U.S. Navy and Coast Guard watchstanders at the JHOC, or Navy Regional 
Security personnel operating at an EOC.   
· Intelligence and sensor information be selectively forwarded to multiple HLS/HLD 
echelons via NIPRNET, SIPRNET or DCTS collaboration. 
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Assessment Information Requirements   
· Detailed information on the status of security forces, and critical infrastructure and assets, 
and assessment-type information on them.   
· Provide information via status boards with a drilldown to detailed information on 
numbers, types, capabilities, and assessments of assets.   
· Provide incident- level status boards.   
· Provide installation status boards. 
· Provide regional- level summary status boards. 
 
Threat Condition Reporting 
· Provide AOR-level means to direct changes to FPCONs, INFOCONs, and MOPP levels.  
· Provide a means to monitor what/when conditions are attained at the installation level.  
· Provide a means to determine problems associated with individual station non-
compliance and sustainability of threat condition capabilities. 
 
Warning, Direction, and Coordination 
· Provide a means to alert installations when specific information or assessments exist.   
· Provide a means to receive acknowledgement of receipt from the affected installation. 
· Provide a means to disseminate guidance, direction, and coordination instructions. 
 
Incident Reporting 
· Provide a means to share incident photographs.  
· Provide a means for collaboration to ensure pertinent information is disseminated.   
· Provide a means for creating and maintaining incident folders so that other reporting and 
materials concerning the incident can be filed in a central location for all to access.   
 
Collaboration 
· Provide multiple Chat rooms, with each to have: 
o Areas for sharing files 
o Discussion forums 
o Audio conferences 
o White board collaboration. 
· Provide a room structure that supports special purpose themes, e.g. Regional- level, 
security forces, peer-to-peer level, geographic area, etc.   
· Provide collaboration information archiving.  
 
Maps 
· Provide the capability to use the following map types: 
o NIMA's SIPRNET web site 
o Geo-registered base maps used by installation Public Works/Civil Engineering 
departments 
o Commercial mapping programs 
o Manually geo-registered map images 
· Provide a means to insert maps into incident folders.  
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Web Site Monitoring   
· Provide a location for a list of recommended web sites for the incident or associated 
information.  
 
 WMD Events and Industrial Accident Situations 
· Provide a means for reachback to obtain assessment of WMD event and industrial 
accidents impact.  
· Provide a means for system calculation of WMD event and industrial accidents impact.  
· Provide a means for immediately promulgating all WMD/I&W information as a 
preventative measure against possible multiple attacks.  
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8.0  MTAC/ASOCC FITNESS CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this section we first examine the correlation between MTAC processes and requirements and 
ASOCC capabilities, then comment on MTAC used of the system, including some 
recommendations.  This is followed by some comments on NCIS's interaction with other centers.  
 
 
8.1 NCIS PROCESSES AND ASOCC CONOPS CORRELATIONS   
 
The ASOCC CONOPS was written to describe how the hardware system would be used to 
support Crisis and Consequence management during a terrorist attack event.  Operations center 
processes are noted, primarily to describe how ASOCC will support them, but the processes 
themselves are not discussed.  Above we have provided descriptions of pertinent MTAC and 
Field Agent processes.  We merge these processes and examine Fitness between them and 
ASOCC capabilities in this section.  This section focuses on: 
· Can ASOCC support the full range of MTAC information processes? 
· Can ASOCC support the full range of Field Agent information processes? 
· Is ASOCC adequate for those processes it could support?  
 
In order to answer these questions, correlations between MTAC processes and ASOCC 
CONOPS are identified for the following elements: 
Purpose/Objectives  
High-Level Functions  
Operational/Tactical Actions 
System and Process Requirements and Capabilities 
We first discuss each of these areas then present the Fitness Table.   
 
Associated questions arise because the existence of ASOCC in MTAC opens the possibility of 
participation more directly in real-time, terrorist-event activities, and becoming more directly 
involved in HLS.   
· Should MTAC expand its activities to provide support to HLS? 
· Should MTAC expand its activities into real-time situational awareness and I&W? 
 
8.1.1 Broad Purpose, Objectives  
ASOCC is designed to support information input, access, display, and exchange, and 
collaboration for decision-making.  MTAC's principal activities are such information processes 
and the correlation between ASOCC CONOPS and MTAC processes at this level is natural and 
expected.  This does not mean that the specific design of the system matches the cohort with 
which NTAC works.  The following general comments are appropriate:   
· ASOCC's collaboration capabilities could improve the workflow of both MTAC 
watchstanders and analysts.  
· ASOCC's capability to display large amounts of diverse information for easy 
comprehension could aid MTAC near-term and real-time analyses. 
 
8.1.2 High-Level Functions       
ASOCC supports four high- level functions.  Two correlate with MTAC functions:  
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· Collaborative course-of-action planning     (MTAC match) 
· Crisis and Consequence Management execution   (Not an MTAC function) 
· Situation monitoring        (MTAC match) 
· Response asset readiness monitoring    (Not an MTAC function) 
 
Collaborative Course-of-Action Planning and situation monitoring, and analyses that are 
required for both, are MTAC responsibilities.  Currently these responsibilities are pre-event and 
longer-range than the support ASOCC is designed to provide.  ASOCC is designed for real- time 
information and collaboration capabilities, for crisis planning/deterrence, and for C2 during the 
Consequence Management phase of an event.   Even so,  
· a system designed for short-term, real- time support can also provide support for longer-
term processes.   
In order to determine if use of the system for MTAC's current activities, the following need to be 
examined:   
· Manning required for using ASOCC for daily operations.      
· Whether the distribution of ASOCC systems is sufficient to support MTAC activities.    
 
Later in this Section we discuss the possibility of MTAC expanding its mission go fully support 
HLS.  If that is done, it would expand its operations to become more involved in real-time 
information and assessments in response to the emerging CONUS threat environment.  Then  
· ASOCC would provide the capabilities needed for this mission with the exception of 
deficiencies that are noted below.   
· SOPs would have to be written for this mission, both for use of ASOCC and for other 
HLS processes using current information exchange means.     
 
8.1.3 Operational/Tactical Actions   
MTAC and NCIS Field Agents have responsibilities for: 
· Providing assessments to naval units  
· Collaboration with other agencies to develop assessments 
· Collaboration with Operations Centers 
· Interaction with local authorities  
ASOCC can support all of these activities, with the caveats noted below.  In addition to these, the 
system is designed to support 
· ID through engagement of specific threat objects  
· Real-time situation monitoring 
 
Providing Assessments to Naval Units 
MTAC has the responsibility to provide a variety of assessments and warnings to naval units, 
including ships.  The types range from Threat Assessments, which are long-range and general, to 
Blue Darts, which are specific and initiate immediate action.   
· ASOCC can provide a distribution means to those units that have the system.  
· Current means, primarily message traffic, will continue to be required. 
· Having parallel means for dis tribution is an advantage.  Redundant paths will be needed 
when one path is unavailable.   
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Collaboration With Other Agencies To Develop Assessments   
A significant portion of MTAC's information input comes from other agencies.  Most of this 
information is at the TS/SCI level.   
· ASOCC cannot support information at the TS/SCI level. 
· ASOCC Chat collaboration tools at the Secret level would benefit assessment operations.  
 
Collaboration With Operations Centers  
MTAC currently coordinates with a number of centers, e.g. ROCs, JITTF.  This is currently done 
to both obtain and provide threat information.   
· AOCC will be at many centers and can implement instant, multi-person collaboration for 
operational and tactical purposes.  
· Assessments could be speeded with use of the system. 
· Availability of side-by-side Secret and Unclassified collaboration could aid fusing both 
types of information.  
 
Interaction With Local Authorities  
I&W and real-time Force Protection information can come from a variety of sources, including 
unclassified such as local police or even civilians.  Current NCIS interaction with local 
authorities is primarily through Field Agents and Field Offices.   
· ASOCC being located in EOCs could speed access to local threat information.  
· Field agents will most often not have direct access to these systems.  
· Local information is filtered through a Field Office (first- level assessment by subject-
matter experts), which will not have an ASOCC system.   
· There is no process for direct MTAC access to locally produced information.  
· It is unclear how local information, vetted for assessment, would be placed in ASOCC 
and how, when, and by whom.   
 
ID Through Engagement Of Specific Threat Objects 
ASOCC has considerable capabilities to identify and track threat objects and to distribute that 
information to local and regional response elements.  Tracking such objects in real-time is not an 
MTAC responsibility.  However, it is an MTAC responsibility to monitor and assess the threat 
environment and knowledge of anything that contributes to that environment is of high interest, 
e.g. a ship that is suspected of carrying WMD.   
· ASOCC's presentation of threat tracks could aid assessing the threat environment.  
· ASOCC may not be in operation and presenting tracks during the pre-event phase.   
 
Real-time Situation Monitoring   
This is only a marginal MTAC responsibility, while a major focus of ASOCC.  MTAC does not 
participate in terrorist-event, tactical C2.   
· Involvement in tactical C2 would be a major addition to MTAC responsibilities. 
· MTAC does have the responsibility to monitor all information to assess current threats 
and provide warnings.   
· The information used for tactical C2 can be important for assessing immediate threats, 
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8.1.4 System Capabilities   
The ASOCC CONOPS specifically address requirements for, and the system has solutions for: 
speed of information access,  
information fusion (presentation for fusion, not the process),  
situation assessment,  
widespread information dissemination, and  
speed of collaboration.   
· The system fully meets these requirements for real-time Consequence Management.   
 
ASOCC does not meet MTAC operations requirements for:  
· Automatic generation of Navy messages and/or e-mail. 
· Field Agent connectivity to SIPRNET when ASOCC is not available to them. 
· Availability at all naval units.  
· TS/SCI information sources and collaboration.  
 
The first two MTAC requirements could be accomplished within ASOCC with some additional 
system development.  The second two are unrealistic.  This implies  
· ASOCC cannot replace existing MTAC process means.  It would have to work in parallel 
with them.   
· This is not a serious restriction.  Regardless of the support provided by the system, the 
requirement to use existing means will remain.   
 
It is unclear whether NCIS Field Agents will have access to ASOCC, probably not.  These 
Agents are an important source of information, both I&W and real-time.  They also provide 
information directly to ships and installations and play a key role in ship Force Protection 
overseas.  Because of these responsibilities, and their possible need for rapid communications, 
consideration must be given to how they carry out their duties when ASOCC is in use.   
· There are no means determined for Agents inputting information to ASOCC.   
· There are no processes for ASOCC distribution of SIRs and Spot Reports.   
· There is no process for Field Office or MTAC verification of information in ASOCC.  
 
There is a classification spectrum for MTAC information, both input and output:  TS/SCI. 
Secret, and a small amount of Unclassified.  The amount of Unclassified would increase if 
MTAC became actively involved in HLS.  Much of MTAC information exchange and 
collaboration for I&W is at TS/SCI.  Messages that are sent to naval units are at the Secret level.   
· MTAC cannot share TS/SCI information using ASOCC because it does not operate at 
that classification level.  This is a significant restriction that reduces the value of ASOCC 
for MTAC.   
 
 
8.2 COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON ASOCC USE 
 
Review of the ASOCC Draft CONOPS has raised issues both with regard to ASOCC use and 
concerning possible additional MTAC responsibilities, especially with regard to possible 
involvement with HLS.  We explore both here, including actions that need to be taken in order to 
make any transition viable.   
 




As noted above, the requirement to disseminate information from MTAC to naval forces via 
message traffic will remain regardless of other means that are put into place.  E-mail is also 
extensively used for alerting.  Thus, if ASOCC and existing means are to operate in parallel: 
· Single-point-entry is needed. 
· If there is no automatic means creating messages and e-mail from single-point-entry, the 
amount of work to be done in MTAC will be increased by inclusion of ASOCC paths.  
Benefits to MTAC from having the ASOCC path also available are:  
· Current messages and e-mail paths can be slow.    
· Use of ASOCC and associated alerting could speed the information processes.   
· Availability of ASOCC could provide an alternate path when current means are down.   
 
Future Context  
Most crucial at this point is deciding how extensively MTAC will support HLS.  How ASOCC 
will be used and what resources will be devoted to its use depend on this decision.  The 
following needs to be done. 
· Determine what role MTAC will play in HLS.  
· Determine what new processes this involvement will introduce, if any.   
· Determine which of these functions will be supported by ASOCC.   
 
The current ASOCC CONOPS and contained SOPs are fairly complete for Crisis and 
Consequence Management.  They do not address many MTAC requirements, which is not a 
shortcoming of the document but a natural consequence of the fact that it was not written for this 
purpose.  A precursor to use of ASOCC by MTAC is to:  
· Develop new MTAC SOPs  
o For use of ASOCC in parallel with current means for current processes. 
o HLS responsibilities. 
· Develop ASOCC SOPs specific to how it provides NCIS support.   
o For placing SIRs, Spot Reports, SARs, etc. in ASOCC.  
o Field Agent access and use.  
 
Personnel Requirements  
ASOCC manning requirements are unclear.  Manning depends on how it will be used, which 
depends on some of the above factors.  It is expected that decisions on how ASOCC will be used 
will depend on whether needed manning can be supported.  The following needs to be done. 
· Determine ASOCC manning requirements for various use configurations.  
o Full 24/7 support for MTAC daily operations.  
o Support for only new HLD operations.  
o Use of the collaboration capabilities for daily analyst operations.  
o Use of the collaboration capabilities by watchstanders.  
 
System Improvements: Fusion of Real-Time and I&W Information 
Pre-terrorist-event I&W information can be valuable for evaluating the current situation.  This 
could be information acquired and processed for as long as several months before an event.  
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Such information needs to be fused with that obtained during the event.  There is currently no 
archive location or process for doing this. 
· Develop a means for inputting, archiving, and retrieving long-term I&W information in 
ASOCC.  
o A permanent archive. 
o A classification scheme so that pertinent information can be identified.  
o A means for extracting that information which applies to the current situation. 
o A means for displaying that information which applies to the current situation.  
· Develop SOP for fusing I&W and current event information for real-time analysis. 
 
System Improvements: Alerting Naval Units to Threats  
The current alerting system in ASOCC needs modification and additional capabilities.  The 
following should be provided: 
· A means to go directly from an alert to pertinent information.  
· Visible alert status for the sender, e.g. has it been opened and acted on.  
· Visual time of entry and status for all ASOCC users 
· Prioritization scheme.  
· Direct alert to the recipient for directed information.  
· Provide special section for official information, such as SAR, SIR, Blue Dart.   
 
As procedures currently stand, Field Agents will have to phone in information to an EOC or an 
NCIS coordinator in order to get it into ASOCC.  In the near future they will have available 
RASP systems so they can send classified information from the field directly to NCIS or MTAC.  
· A means is needed for this information to go directly to ASOCC when Agents use RASP.   
 
 
8.3 ASOCC IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER NAVY SYSTEMS   
 
The combination of MTACs I&W information, real-time local threat information, and local 
sensor information for SA, produces a broad spectrum that no single current system is designed 
to accommodate.  This opens the possibility of using more than one system to meet 
requirements.  Ideally, one would like a fusion of existing systems.  
 
Requirements for a system-of-systems are:  
· Support TS/SCI I&W information.   
· Have a means for transferring information across classification levels.  
· Be accessible to all naval units. 
· Ingest and display sensor information. 
· Provide a Common Operational Picture (COP) for shared Situational Awareness.  
· Support multiple levels of C2. 
· Contain human friendly GUIs for rapid situation assessment. 
· Have archive and retrieval capabilities for analysis.  
 
The Navy currently has systems that collectively meet all of the above requirements, with 
ASOCC adding the needed COP and SA at the local level.  For example: 
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· Joint Fires Network (JFN) 
· Tactical Exploitation System- Navy (TES-N) 
· Collaboration at Sea (CaS)  
· Global Command and Control System (GCCS) 
These are chosen these (there are others) for illustration because the first two support Navy Fires 
and the last two provide access throughout the Fleets.  Navy Fires processes have some 
correspondence to what needs to be done for the HLS and Navy Force Protection operations 
noted in this report.   
 
JFN methods and systems may provide some solutions for MTAC.  Compatibility with ASOCC 
would be needed, which is not technically difficult.  
 
Much of MTAC's information and collaboration is at the TS/SCI level.  If network solutions are 
to be used for information dissemination at the Secret level, a means is needed to move 
information between these levels.  JFN includes TES-N (TS/SCI) for image exploitation and 
ADOCS (SECRET/NOFORN) for target execution.  The following capabilities exist: 
· TES-N processes TS/SCI information and passes Secret target information to ADOCS for 
target exploitation.   
· TES-N can also pass information to GCCS for SA.   
Thus, technical solutions for the exchange of information across classification levels exist.  It is 
germane that 
· ASOCC has capabilities for import of information from GCCS. 
 
Solutions are available that, in combination, could meet all of MTAC information requirements.  
This does not mean that it will be simple to hook the various components into a complete system 
that meets these requirements.  The next subsection deals with a possible road ahead.   
 
The need to provide information to all naval units is a significant consideration for any system 
supporting MTAC operations.  ASOCC will not be available at all locations with which MTAC 
has to exchange information.  We assume that network-based information systems are the wave 
of the future and moving toward that type of solution is needed.  Most challenging are small 
ships at sea, which have intermittent internet connectivity and limited bandwidth.  The 
Collaboration at Sea system exists on essentially all Navy ships.  It is a replication system that 
updates information files whenever a ship has connectivity and logs on.   
· CaS is not directly compatible with ASOCC, JFN, or its variants and it would be 
somewhat cumbersome to use for this application without modifications.   
· However, it illustrates that network solutions to widespread distribution are available 
without starting from scratch.   
 
 
8.4 RECOMMENDED PROCESS MODELING  
 
This work has expanded beyond examining support that ASOCC, a system designed for other 
purposes, can provide for current MTAC processes.  The discussion has ranged from the 
requirement to reach all naval units to possible new missions to support HLS.  Included has been 
the possibility of combinations of ASOCC with existing systems, none of which are currently 
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used by MTAC.  Sorting all this out so that a sensible way-ahead can be determined is 
complicated.   
 
We have suggested a possible solution to meet all requirements that makes use of several 
systems.  Those systems have been designed for other purposes, are different programs, and none 
have considered MTAC processes.  A process to look at available solutions together, with a 
primary focus on MTAC Force Protection responsibilities, is needed.   
 
The means by which such studies are carried out is process modeling.  It is recommended that 
such a study be undertaken to determine appropriate solutions for the full spectrum of MTAC 
and Navy Force Protection.  The study would include how to utilize a combination of systems 
and processes.  Without such a study, sorting out how best MTAC can support full-spectrum FP, 
including HLS, will be difficult.   
 
Such work is simplified by modern methods that allow one to modularize processes.  One would 
build modules that represent operational processes, FP and Fires primarily.  The modules would 
have layers so that information flow and decisions would be transparent.  MTAC would probably 
be a module of its own.  The focus would be on information flow and how proposed systems 
support that flow.  The techniques to perform such a study are well known and software is 
readily available to streamline the study.   
 
Note that even the ASOCC CONOPS alludes to such a study in their recommendation that 
information flow diagrams are needed as a basis for CONOPS and SOP development.  The 
DRAFT CONOPS contains the statement, added by the authors as an edit:  "[Information clutter 
management needs to be figured out.  Much larger issue is strategy of information flow up the 
chain.  Diagram “ASOCC INFORMATION FLOW PATHS” is a start. Supporting logic needs to 
be drafted.]"  This reprot concurs with the statement's implications and recommends that 
information flow diagrams be developed to: 
· Map non-ASOCC MTAC information paths. 
· Map MTAC information paths assuming ASOCC and current means used in parallel.  
· Map MTAC/ASOCC information paths for any new processes to support HLD.  
Process modeling would follow and use these information flow diagrams 
 
 
8.5 INTERACTION WITH OPERATIONS CENTERS  
 
The JHOC CONOPS contains elements describing how that Center will support Crisis and 
Consequence Management operations, and describes information tasks which will be supported 
by ASOCC.  The CONOPS was written for that Center’s operation, and does not include 
processes that involve MTAC.   
 
An underlying assumption of the CONOPS, and the processes described by the MIDLANT ROC 
personnel, is that Operations Center (OC) interaction with NCIS will remain as is.  It is currently 
through the Field Office or a Field Agent assigned to the OC and sitting in the Center during a 
crisis operation.  There is no direct interaction with MTAC.  The presence of ASOCC potentially 
changes this.  If MTAC expands its operations in response to HLS, overlap of responsibilities 
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will increase.  Thus, it is appropriate for this study to consider OC operations and how MTAC 
may interact with them.  JHOC is used as the example for this discussion.   
 
MTAC Shared Responsibilities with JHOC 
MTAC has the responsibility to provide I&W information to Navy units, including ships.  JHOC 
will necessarily communicate with Navy ships that are in or approaching the harbor and a Navy 
Watchstander may be in the JHOC during a crisis situation.  It is not currently specified how the 
responsibility for alerting naval units will be shared.  The CONOPS refers to the services having 
TACON over their assets, but this doesn't clarify who supplies, or how, the following types of 
information: 
 a. Standard I&W. 
 b. Force Protection, real-time terrorist threat.  
 c. Local, multi-component Situational Awareness. 
For a:  Providing standard I&W is a current MTAC responsibility and they have means 
for doing so for several levels of warning.  This includes Force Protection information.   
For b:  The situation with real-time information is unclear.  Agents in the field 
communicate directly with ships and shore installations during a crisis so real-time information 
may not go through MTAC.   
For c:  Local, multi-component Situational Awareness information is not currently an 
MTAC responsibility.   
 
Overlaps exist but there are functional differences.  MTAC functions are inherently longer range.  
The JHOC deals with events immediately before and as they are occurring, whereas MTAC 
focuses on longer-range analysis and planning.  Again, a central question is whether MTAC will 
become more involved in real-time information and assessments.  If it does, the overlap will be 
significant.   
 
The operational and tactical actions planned for a JHOC include ID through engagement of 
specific threat objects.  These are not MTAC respons ibilities unless the ID function extends back 
in time to threat I&W.  If it does, MTAC has a role to play.  That role would be the assessment 
one it now plays and promulgating threat information.  Presumably, it would pass such 
information to the JHOC, which would then fuse it with their real time information.   
· SOPs for how information exchange and collaboration between MTAC and OCs are 
needed. 
 
The JHOC CONOPS discusses operations during the time the Center is in operation, which is 
immediately preceding or during an event.  There will be a pre-event phase where I&W is the 
primary activity.  Information from this phase will be a key component of what JHOC has 
initially available.  MTAC will play a major role in providing such information.   
· Procedures for making this information available and installing it within JHOC are 
needed. 
The JHOC CONOPS lists several needed databases, but there is no reference to NCIS 
information.  Information in SARs, SIRs, Spot Reports, etc, will be needed by a JHOC.   
· SOPs need to be developed to make this information available to the JHOC.   
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The requirement to disseminate information from MTAC to naval forces via message traffic will 
remain regardless of other means that are put into place.  Whether or not JHOC CONOPS, SOP, 
or TTP should address this is not clear.   
· MTAC SOPs are needed for situations where a JHOC is in place and information 
exchange with them is required.   
· There is, as yet, no indication of how these tasks would be shared between MTAC and a 
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A continuing concern for the United States is the threat of additional terrorist attacks against 
its critical infrastructure, historical landmarks, civilian populations, and military facilities both at 
home and abroad.  The Navy is taking aggressive action to reduce and counter the threat of 
additional small boat attacks such as the one that seriously damaged the Aegis guided missile 
destroyer USS COLE in Aden harbor on 12 October 2000.  Since that time there have been 
indications that Al Qaeda might be planning to replicate that attack, which remains a classic case 
of asymmetric warfare, and to exploit other critical vulnerabilities against other naval assets and 
maritime centers of gravity.  The proliferation and increasing lethality of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), for example, has added new and frightening dimensions to the problem.  As 
communication, logistics, and other related systems become more sophisticated and 
interconnected, they also become more vulnerable to disruption, not only from terrorists/SOF but 
also from industrial accidents and natural disasters.  Consequently, the need has never been 
greater to combine the strengths and resources of U.S. military forces and civilian intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies to deter attacks and mitigate the impact of attacks, accidents, and 
natural disasters. 
 
The missions of the Navy and naval components of the Unified Commands requiring 
command and control of facilities ashore include foreign and domestic Antiterrorism /Force 
Protection (AT/FP), Homeland Security (HLS) and Homeland Defense (HLD).  The goal of a 
Navy C4ISR technical architecture is to support these missions with guidelines for a robust and 
flexible infrastructure that is compliant with applicable technical standards to ensure both the 
wide-ranging interoperability and the security required for these missions.  A unique feature of 
these missions is the requirement to collaborate with DOD, Federal, State and local authorities 
within the borders of the United States, as well as with coalition forces beyond our borders to 
deter, prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters and 
other emergencies.  Governing policies, doctrine and plans include Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), Joint Pub 3-10 Doctrine for Rear Area Security Operations, 
The Interagency Counterterrorism CONPLAN and the Federal Response Plan.  
 
The Area Security Operations Command and Control (ASOCC) system addresses the 
need for an effective C4ISR architecture to support command and control of joint antiterrorism / 
force protection (AT/FP) efforts and to coordinate such efforts with other DoD components, 
other federal, state and local agencies and s.  The fully integrated GOTS and COTS software that 
makes up the ASOCC tool kit is the product of a multi-component integration and configuration 
effort by DISA in support of Joint Staff validated requirements for execution of AT/FP 
operations under Joint Pub 3-10 [series].  It integrates and streamlines the flow and processing of 
information to enable commanders, coordinators, security forces, and first responders to make 
quicker and better-informed decisions related to planning base defenses and security operations; 
and responding to attacks, accidents and natural disasters.  It provides multi-echelons of 
command with security responsibilities and a means to: 
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· Deter terrorist surveillance activity by integrating event trigger and remote sensor 
feeds to provide real-time logging, alerting and event visualization capabilities.   
 
· Conduct secure, multimedia collaboration between echelons, agencies and 
organizations to enhance understanding of potential threats, provide warning, direct 
force protection-related conditions and measures, and report status of achieving those 
directions. 
 
· Assemble and share a common and complete tactical picture of the threat 
environment; and the location and status of friendly security forces, operations, 
critical assets and infrastructure. 
 
· Directly support the security forces at the installation level by providing a means to 
potentially incorporate the inputs of and collaboration with other first responders (e.g. 
local law enforcement, fire department, medical, etc.), enhancing the comprehensive 
response to incidents of concern. 
Joint and DOD Drivers 
 The mission need for improved AT/FP and related C2 capabilities was codified in the 
wake of the USS Cole incident when increased attention was placed on improving DOD's ability 
to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters and other 
emergencies threatening DOD installations overseas.  Joint Pub 3-10 Doctrine for Rear Area 
Security Operations and the Global C2 Management Structure, outlined in CJCSI/M 6721, 
provided the CONOPS and requirements underpinnings that enabled rapid deployment of initial 
C4ISR capabilities conformant with joint architecture and policy.  JP 3-10 continues to provide 
good insights for structuring command and organizational relationships to coordinate AT/FP and 
complements direction to define "a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and 
technologies covering [an] incident command system…" as outlined in Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive Nbr. 5 (HSPD-5).  HSPD-5 further directs all federal agencies to ensure 
that their systems are interoperable with National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
standards to be specified by DHS in compliance with HSPD-5.  With ASOCC, the Navy's 
continuing efforts to deploy Ashore C4ISR capabilities are able to build on Joint requirements 
and architecture as documented in the Joint Staff's Global Requirements Identification Database 
(GRiD), with allocated requirements documented in the AT/FP Joint Allocated Requirements 
Repository (JARR).   
 
 Scope  
The purpose of this CONOPS is to describe the features of the ASOCC system (to 
include those envisioned as future capabilities within the scope of the current development 
cycle), the architecture in which it will operate, and the concept of how users will employ it to 
support their operational requirements.  This CONOPS focuses on force protection within 
CONUS-based AOR (e.g. Homeland Security/Homeland Defense assets).  A separate CONOPS 
is envisioned to be developed (as required) to address issues associated with utilization of a 
C4ISR system in support of the Joint Rear Area Command (JRAC) environment for 
expeditionary forces. 
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SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
ASOCC does not work from a central database, but rather is primarily a client-server system 
topology with the capability for workstations to operate autonomously using data stored locally 
if communications paths are lost or degraded.  Clients can retrieve data directly from other 
workstations (commonly referred to as a peer-to-peer relationship), and all clients are able to 
access specific, remote databases (security classifications allowing) via servers that are not part 
of the ASOCC system itself (See Figure 1).  Clients needing classified information will use the 
SIPRNET over existing connections.  Remote clients can access an installation’s NIPRNET via 
Dial-up and the establishment of a Virtual Private Network (VPN.) 
 
ASOCC supports different types of users.  The first is at the installation level, horizontally 
among security forces’ nodes, command nodes, and eventually various other first responder 
nodes; the second is vertically from the installation level up through multiple echelons of 
command.  
 
At the installation level, ASOCC supports nodes dealing with the tactical security problem 
on and immediately around the installation.  It will operate over the NIPRNET in an 
Unclassified/FOUO security environment, protected by the installation’s network firewall and 
other security measures.  Workstations can potentially be located at a command’s Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC), Security Forces’ Operations Center (SFOC); a Joint Operations Center 
(JOC); ships in port; and other first responder nodes on or near the installation (e.g. fire 
department, civil engineering, medical, etc.) 
 
 To support multiple echelons of U.S. command and coordination ASOCC workstations 
will be located in Operations Centers at the Regional and Echelon One levels.  These 
workstations will operate over the SIPRNET in a classified (SECRET) security environment.   
 
Security Classification Considerations 
ASOCC workstations will have to operate in one of two security environments: Classified, 
(SECRET level) operating on the SIPRNET; or Unclassified, operating on the NIPRNET. 
 
An automated Multi-Level Security (MLS) system is the preferred method for transferring 
appropriately classified information between the two security domains, however, there is 
currently no appropriate and accredited MLS available for use on ASOCC.  Transfer of 
information between these two air-gapped domains will be handled by disk transfer until an 
approved MLS system is in place, (see Figure 1). 
 









































FIGURE 1 – ASOCC ARCHITECTURE










Unclassified ASOCC system 





































The ASOCC software applications operate on a normal personal computer with sufficient 
capacity and with a single VGA monitor or an integrated 3-monitor (preferred) 
configuration, (see Figure 2).  The ASOCC software applications are added to the PC, 
which functions on the command’s LAN as any other workstation. 
 
 The 3-screen configuration of a standard ASOCC workstation allows all of the ASOCC 




Figure 2.  ASOCC’s 3-screen configuration. 
 
ASOCC consists of a series of tools that allow users to: 
      
· Conduct real-time audio, chat room, white board, and file sharing collaboration with 
other users (Defense Collaboration Tool Suite-DCTS), 
 
· Monitor multiple web sites of interest (KnowledgeBoard), 
 
· Update and monitor status boards on force protection and other security-related 
conditions (eX-Panel), 
 
· Update and monitor status boards on critical infrastructure and assets (eX-Panel), 
 
· Update and monitor status boards on security forces (both U.S. and ) (eX-Panel), 
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· Pull geo-registered data, overlays, and maps from multiple local and remote 
databases, and integrate them to produce a locally tailored, but common tactical 
picture of the AOR.  Integrate this with user-generated information on incidents with 
force protection implications (eXtensible Information Systems- XIS), 
 
· Share information on incidents with force protection implications (multiple 
applications), 
 
· Import non-geo-registered imagery and mapping products, and feeds from remote 
sensors to enhance situational awareness (Java Imagery and Video Exploitation- 
JIVE), 
 
· Provide warning, direction, and coordination (eX-panel), 
 
· Calculate and share information on areas potentially and actually affected by WMD 
events, natural disasters and industrial accidents (Consequence Assessment Tool Set -
CATS/XIS), 
 
The eX-Panel is the central menu from which to access other applications, maintain 
electronic log entries on events and incidents of force protection interest, send warning 






These log entries are then automatically distributed to other ASOCC users via peer-to-peer 
relationships over the SIPRNET or NIPRNET.  This is the primary means of disseminating 
information on incidents that will make up the common tactical picture among ASOCC 
users.  Event Log entries that have positional data associated with them can have that data 
displayed on a geographic display.  The eX-Panel also features system-generated alerts and 
user-defined checklists linked to specific types of reported events. 
Figure 3.  ASOCC’s eX-Panel display. 
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The Extensible Information System 
(XIS) is the primary situational 
awareness visualization tool in 
ASOCC, and provides a means to 
import geo-registered data from a 
variety of databases and integrate it to 
form a consolidated graphical tactical 
picture.  This provides an operator 
with the ability to keep track of 
activity in the AOR through the use of 
geo-registered maps and images, 
incident locations from the Event Log, 
critical infrastructure status 
information from local and shared 




Within XIS is the Consequence 
Assessment Tool Set (CATS).  The 
CATS tool set enables the display of 
plume models, providing the ASOCC 
operator the ability to assess the 
potential effects of WMD and industrial 










Figure 4.  Extensible Information System (XIS) Tool. 
Figure 5.  Consequence Assessment Tool Set (CATS) 
 




Tool Suite (DCTS)  is a 
means for multiple ASOCC 
users to conduct real-time 
video, audio, chat room, 
and white board 
collaboration, and file 
sharing.  This can be done 
over secure or non-secure 









KnowledgeBoard enables users to 
simultaneously monitor up to nine 
user-defined web sites, and 
automatically refreshes the view of 
the web pages being monitored at 
user-defined intervals.  This feature 
is ideal for monitoring intelligence 
and weather web sites to which 
new and updated information is 
often posted, as well as monitoring 








The JAVA Imagery and Video Exploitation (JIVE) tool enables users to import images in a 
variety of formats and to manipulate and annotate them for better situationa l 
awareness/collaboration purposes.  JIVE also enables users to import video, for example real-
time feeds from a UAV; thus enabling multiple and geographically separated users to view the 
same picture.  (See Figure 8.) 
 
Figure 6.  Defense Collaboration Tool Suite (DCTS) 
Figure 7.  KnowledgeBoard 
 







 The ASOCC system provides the C4ISR backbone that permits the integration of sensor 
data, intelligence information, and decision/analysis aids into a shared, fused, real-time, common 
operating picture.  This system permits the rapid exchange of pertinent information with both 
vertical and horizontal connectivity among each responsible activity or command, resulting in 
the: 
· Enhanced prevention opportunities to potential threats 
· Timely reaction to emergent crisis situations 
· Efficient coordination of resources to execute decision plans 
· Effective incident response through collaborative planning/decision-making 
 
 The complexity, scope and potential consequences associated with a terrorist attack, 
particularly in response to the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), require that there be 
a rapid and decisive capability to assess and resolve the situation.  The prevention / deterrence 
and defeat of a potential act of terrorism demands an extraordinary level of coordination, 
collaboration and sharing of technical expertise across all levels of government.  Development 
and installation of a C4ISR system, coupled with sensors and alerted security forces, are key 
elements in providing for a meaningful AT/FP capability.  
Figure 8.  Java Imagery and Video Exploitation (JIVE) 
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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
 
Introduction 
 This CONOPS is intended to provide a strategy for the integration and employment of 
ASOCC in support of a tailored, time-phased, coordinated response by Homeland 
Security/Homeland defense assets in response to a terrorist threat or incident.  While it is 
recognized that several non-DoD agencies and local municipalities (for example: New York Port 
Authority, San Diego Port Authority, New Orleans Police Department and Louisiana National 
Guard, etc.) have already purchased and deployed ASOCC, this CONOPS exclusively focuses 
on Navy employment, and in particular, the current Phase I employment strategy (e.g. San Diego 
and Norfolk fleet concentration areas).  This CONOPS does not supersede existing plans or 
organizational relationships that were developed for response to incidents under department and 
agency statutory authorities.  This CONOPS does, however, attempt to identify how ASOCC 
would be used to meet the critical demands associated with the HLS/HLD mission. Other 
CONOPS assumptions include: 
 
· Terrorist incidents may occur at any time of day, with little or no warning, and may 
involve a single or multiple geographic areas, and possibly result in mass casualties 
 
· No single government agency at the local, State, or Federal level will possess the 
expertise to act unilaterally on the many difficult issues that may arise   
 
· Agencies at all levels would need to respond on short notice in order to provide effective 
and timely prevention and/or response to a threat or incident 
 
· Response operations might be require over a multi-jurisdictional, multi-State region, 
requiring Local, State, and Federal responders to coordinate responsibilities and actions 
 
Mission 
 The Department of Defense is a support agency to the Department of Justice (with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation acting as the lead delegate) for crisis management functions, and 
is a support agency to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for consequence 
management.  In accordance with DoD directives 3025.15 and 2000.12, and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff CONPLAN 0300-97, and upon approval by the Secretary of Defense, DoD 
will provide assistance to the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) and/or other primary agencies as 
appropriate, during all aspects of a terrorist incident, including both crisis and consequence 
management.  DoD assistance includes threat assessment, operational and tactical support, and 
response to the presence of a WMD device. 
 
 Within the DoD/DHLS the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard have complimentary and 
overlapping Homeland Security/Port Security missions that require rapid and effective 
integration of protection mechanisms in cooperation with other local, State, and Federal 
agencies.  The spectrum of agencies involved, and the acute need for a development of common 
situational awareness, collaborative course-of-action planning, and cooperative decision-making 
provides the impetus for ASOCC’s C4ISR system. 
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Employment Scheme 
The number of ASOCC systems available, the specific scenarios in different theaters, the 
requirements of the Global Naval Concept of Operations and other issues will affect how 
ASOCC is employed worldwide.  Within CONUS however, it is envisioned that the Navy would 
install ASOCC terminals at key decision/collaboration points both within the “incident level” 
and the “multi-echelon level” hierarchies, (Figure 9).  
 
“Incident level”.   Incident- level ASOCC sites/participants would be first critical C4I 
link between “first responders” charged with dealing with the immediate and short-term effects 
at the onset of an emergency or disaster, and the supporting local/State/Federal (civilian and 
DoD) organizations charged with executing larger scale responsibilities envisioned in the Federal 
Response Plan (FRP).  ASOCC sites involved in the “incident level” would principally include: 
 
· Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC) – manned by USN, USCG, and specified 
local law enforcement personnel. Both a Classified ASOCC terminal (e.g. 
ASOCC-High) and an Unclassified terminal (e.g. ASOCC-Low) would be onsite. 
 
· Emergency Operations Center (EOC) – Often serves as the response team’s 
“dispatch” center.  Normally each local agency or regional State/Federal agency, 
such as Customs, Border Patrol, Local Police, County Sheriffs Department, Navy 
Regional Commander, have an EOC which is routinely manned 7/24 during 
peacetime operations.  It is envisioned that some ASOCC-Low systems would be 
onsite or available to local municipalities and regional State/Federal agency 
EOCs.  
 
· Joint Operations Center (JOC) – The term JOC is used by both the military and 
Federal agencies to identify a key decision-making command center used to 
manage and direct specified response activities.  For C2F/C3F, which have 
specified coordination and supporting responsibilities within their AORs, both 
ASOCC-High and ASOCC-Low terminals would be ava ilable within their JOCs.  
When a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) designates a regional Federal On-Scene-
Commander (F-OSC), they too are authorized to stand-up a JOC.  In fleet 
concentration areas, (assuming appropriate MOAs are in place), the LFA-JOC 
could be co- located with the Navy Regional Commander’s RCC/ROC, enabling a 
quicker C4I start-up, along with enhanced ongoing information-sharing and 
mutually-supported decision-making.  
 
· Navy Regional Command Center (RCC) or Navy Regional Operations Center 
(ROC) – Depending upon the level, complexity, and immediacy of the crisis, a 
RCC/ROC would be stood up as ordered by the USN Regional Commander.  This 
center serves as the key transition point between “incident- level” and “multi-
echelon level” hierarchies.  Both ASOCC-Low and ASOCC-High terminals 
would be available onsite. 
 
“Multi-echelon level”.  Multi-echelon level participants would be provided a 
prioritized, pre-screened level of information to reduce clutter from routine traffic and to focus 
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decisions on higher level requirements (e.g. “information push”).  Given that ASOCC is a peer-
to-peer network, all information is available to be shared among all ASOCC workstations.  
Therefore if a Commander desired additional information on an event, it can still be accessed 
from the subordinate levels, (e.g. “information pull”).  ASOCC sites involved in the “Multi-
echelon level” would include: 
 
· USNORTHCOM/ECH 1 Commands/LFA – The Federal Response Plan (FRP) 
identifies unique and specific responsibilities to each Federal Agency in response 
to an act of terrorism or other national emergency.  For the purpose of this 
CONOPS it is assumed that the respective Operations Centers of these activities 
(e.g. National Command Center, Navy Operations Center, etc.) would have an 
ASOCC terminal, or the ability to easily integrate ASOCC software. 
 
· NAVNORTH/JFMCC – The Unified Command Plan (UCP) designates 
NAVNORTH as the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) 
responsible for Operational Control of Maritime defense forces.  The JFMCC 
would have an ASOCC-High terminal, with all ASOCC-Low data and video 
features mirrored to the High-side system.     
 
· CPF/CLF – As Maritime Defense force providers each of these major commands 
would have both ASOCC-High and ASOCC-Low terminals.    
 
Coordination/Support, Command and Control Strategy 
ASOCC would operate throughout the continuum of operations as part of a distributed 
C4ISR network to include Navy, Coast Guard, Federal, State and Local emergency response 
agencies.  Command and control of a terrorist threat or begins with the first response team, 
normally assigned by either a local law enforcement dispatch center (in the case of a civil attack) 
or a military security/police dispatch office (for DoD facility security).  Depending upon the 
nature, complexity, and/or severity of the crisis, one or more local, State, or Federal agencies 
may become involved.  The first response team would be normally lead by a local Incident 
Commander located either on-scene or at a JHOC or EOC.  Depending upon the complexity, 
scope, and severity of the crisis, the local Navy Regional Commander would stand-up a Regional 
Command Center (also called a Regional Operations Center).  This RCC/ROC serves as the 
transition point between incident- level crisis and consequence management/reporting and multi-
echelon communication/decision-making/support.   Since ASOCC is a peer-to-peer network, 
allowing permissive/approved access to all users for information being assimilated on the net, the 
concept of a command and control process, with strict hierarchies for reporting and 
communication, is not entirely applicable.  Yet the ASOCC toolkit does provide commanders 
with mission-critical capabilities to plan, coordinate, integrate and manage AT/FP operations by 
integrating the efforts of the Joint Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), CPF/CLF, 
C2F/C3F, other U.S. Combatant Commanders, Navy Regional Commanders, U.S. Coast Guard 




































Incident Level.  At the incident level, both an Unclassified (e.g ASOCC-Low) and a Classified 
(e.g. ASOCC-High) network would be maintained. Sensor feeds coming from Radar, CCTV, 
Thermal Imagers, etc., would be fed into the ASOCC-Low terminals located at the JHOC, EOC, 
and RCC/ROC.  The purpose of these sensor feeds is to aid incident- level nodes in visualizing 
the location and status of incidents, friendly forces and defenses, and to ensure proper and timely 
support by available resources. Local and State agencies such as local police, harbor patrol, fire 
department, etc., would have input and access to the ASOCC-Low network.  Using this sensor 
network, along with inputs from security patrols and onscene observers, JHOC/EOC 
watchstanders would maintain a tactical picture of the area of interest, whether it be at a specific 
base installation, harbor, or facility perimeter.  This tactical picture will consist, at a minimum, 
of: 
 
· The location and identification of U.S. and supporting security forces. 
 
· The location and details of events and incidents with installation security implications.  
Using the Event Log on the eX-Panel, these log entries will be linked to locally 
developed, interactive (future capability) checklists to expedite the taking and logging of 
actions. 














































AFNORTH, ARNORTH, MARNORTH 
HLS 
HLD 




  61 
 
 
· Information on events happening off-base.  These will be entered into ASOCC by the 
federal, state and local agencies that maintain nodes, or reported via JOC channels. 
 
 Creation of incident reports in the ASOCC Event Log by JHOC/EOC personnel would 
provide a primary (“quicklook”) information summary for use by higher (e.g. multi-echelon 
level) command elements.  
 
 JHOC/EOC personnel would also  maintain database information on the location, identity 
and status of critical infrastructure and assets that is compatible with XIS (e.g. MS Access 
database or Oracle database) so that it can be displayed in XIS and shared with other users.   
These ASOCC watchstanders may locally create and use “overlays” for the tactical picture 
graphic display showing base defense, FPCON, and other contingency plans to aid in situation 
response. 
 
 If intelligence suggests the possibility of a WMD threat, or in response to an actual WMD 
event and/or industrial accident, ASOCC watchstanders would calculate and display graphic 
overlays of the estimated areas affected (using the CATS tool) and be responsible for reporting 
the incident in ASOCC.  (Note: When other first responders have ASOCC, the fire department, 
disaster response group, or other designated incident-level organizations may be responsible for 
WMD event calculation and reporting in ASOCC.) 
 
 ASOCC watchstanders may also choose to designate chat rooms for collaboration in the 
Defense Collaboration Tools Suite and specify the purpose for each room.  They can establish 
these chat rooms for constant monitoring and establish schedules for regular collaboration 
sessions involving key personnel or nodes.   
 
Multi-Echelon Level.  This segment of the CONOPS addresses the information requirements 
and C2 requirements above the incident-level.  ASOCC workstations supporting this portion of 
the CONOPS will (generally) operate at classified security levels on the SIPRNET. 
 
Tactical Information Requirements.  Commanders, coordinators and intelligence analysts at 
all levels require information on incidents with security implications for a variety of purposes.  
This includes information on incidents occurring on or near U.S. installations, and in the entire 
AOR; and they all need to have the same information.  They also require information on the 
location and identification of critical infrastructure and assets, and off-base operations. 
 
While forces at U.S. installations will be the source of information on incidents occurring on 
or very near U.S. installations, JOCs and various Federal, State and local agencies will be the 
source of information on incidents occurring in the rest of the AOR.  Regional Operations 
Centers (ROCs) (via their bilateral cells) are where information derived from regional level 
organizations will be entered into ASOCC for dissemination to all echelons (using the Event Log 
in the ExPanel).   
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Information on the locations and identities of critical infrastructure and assets are maintained 
by the installation command post/EOC.  These local databases can be shared via file sharing in 
the DCTS and/or disseminated periodically via email, and displayed graphically using XIS. 
  
Echelons above the installation level will routinely not have need of tactical information on 
the locations and composition of on-base security forces.  There is, however, a need for general 
knowledge of the location and composition of security forces in the AOR, particularly those 
earmarked to support U.S. installations and those protecting off-base infrastructure critical to 
U.S. operations.  ROCs, and JOCs will obtain this type of information from their counterparts, 
and enter it into local databases.  As with the local critical infrastructure databases, these can be 
shared via the DCTS and displayed graphically using XIS.  Alternatively, the location of forces 
can be displayed using the overlay palate of XIS; which can also be shared using DCTS. 
 
Tactical type information originated on unclassified ASOCCs and in unclassified databases 
will migrate to the classified side at the JHOC/EOC or RCC/ROC.  Both of these should have 
access to ASOCCs operating on unclassified and classified networks. 
 
Sensor Integration 
ASOCC is envisioned to serve as the C4ISR “backbone” for AT/FP "plug and play" 
sensor packages that can be changed, modified, or removed in a short period of time.  ASOCC 
will provide space, common open architecture, and a common control system for these sensors.  
It is envisioned that while raw sensor inputs would be directed to the regional and/or functional 
workgroup servers within the “incident- level”, all sensor information could be selectively 
“pushed” or “pulled” to any other functional group or ASOCC station within the network.  For 
example, regional Border Patrol, Customs, or other Non-DoD law-enforcement organizations 
with an ASOCC station at their disposal, might be able to provide valuable cueing information 
on contacts or areas of interest to U.S. Navy and Coast Guard watchstanders at the JHOC, or 
Navy Regional Security personnel operating at an EOC.  This intelligence and sensor 
information could also be selectively forwarded to multiple HLS/HLD echelons via NIPRNET, 
SIPRNET or DCTS collaboration. 
 
Assessment Information Requirements   
Another type of information required by echelons above the incident-level is detailed 
information on the status of security forces, and critical infrastructure and assets; and 
assessment-type information on them.  This type of information is best conveyed using status 
boards with a drilldown to detailed information on numbers, types, capabilities, and assessments 
of assets.  This type of information will be classified.  The primary source of this information 
resides at the incident- level, which will maintain the status boards.  Summary status boards and 
assessments presented by Service will be maintained at the regional level. 
 
When U.S. forces are using civilian airfields and ports for HLD operations, the Service 
Component conducting the operations at that site will maintain status board and assessment 
information on those sites unless ASOCC connectivity with those locations can be attained, in 
which case the site will maintain its own status board and assessment information. 
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The initial CONOPS for sharing status board-type information is for each installation to 
maintain status boards on its SIPRNET web site.  These could then be accessed directly and 
individually via the SIPRNET, or multiple sites could be monitored using the KnowledgeBoard 
tool in ASOCC.  In the future, this type of status board function will be an integral feature of 
ASOCC. 
 
Threat Condition Reporting 
Commanders in the AOR require a means to direct changes to FPCONs, INFOCONs and 
MOPP levels based on threat assessments and conditions.  They also require a means to monitor 
what and when conditions are attained at the installation level and problems associated with non-
compliance and sustainability. 
 
SIPRNET web sites with FPCON, INFOCON and MOPP level information can be 
maintained at the incident- level using the Event Log function of ASOCC, which can direct 
changes and view the FPCON status of individual bases/installations. 
 
Warning, Direction, and Coordination 
There are several means to provide warning to installations when specific information or 
assessments exist.  The Event Log function of the ASOCC ExPanel can be one of them; 
redundancy in such cases is preferable.  Nodes having warning type information can disseminate 
it directly to the security forces and installation decision makers using ASOCC, and (future 
capability) receive acknowledgement of receipt from the affected installation. 
 
Likewise, watchstanders at the RCC/ROC can use the Event Log to disseminate guidance, 
direction, and coordination instructions. 
 
Incident Reporting 
When a significant incident occurs, there is normally a great deal of reporting on the incident, 
photographs to be shared, collaboration to be done to ensure pertinent information is 
disseminated.  As a standard practice, the originator of an incident report in the Event Log, 
besides providing updates to the log report, should create a folder about the incident in a DCTS 
room so that other reporting and materials concerning the incident can be filed in a central 
location for all to access.  The initial incident reporting node should include the name and 
location of this folder in the incident event log entry as well as information on which 
collaboration room in DCTS will be the focal point for collaboration on the incident being 
reported.  [Information clutter management needs to be figured out.  Much larger issue is 
strategy of information flow up the chain.  Diagram “ASOCC INFORMATION FLOW PATHS” 
is a start. Supporting logic needs to be drafted.]    
 
Collaboration 
The DCTS is organized into collaboration “buildings”, “floors” and “rooms”.  Each room 
has areas for sharing files, conducting chat room discussions, audio conferences, and white board 
collaboration. 
 
An AOR room will be used primarily for sharing administrative information, files of 
interest to all nodes in the echelon, and Regional level chat sessions. 
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Additional rooms are primarily for sharing security force status type information by 
Region; i.e. COMNAVREGSW can coordinate Navy security forces in the CNRSW room of 
DCTS. 
 
Other rooms can be created/used to discuss and share information on security incidents 
occurring within peer-to-peer geographic areas.  For example, when a significant incident occurs 
in one harbor, then the affected regional JHOC can utilized ASOCC to immediately alert other 
JHOCs as to the situation and any preceding indications and warnings (I&W).  An incident 
collaboration room could be established, along with an incident folder, so that anyone with 
information, messages, photographs, etc. related to the incident can log them or upload them.  
Chat sessions with information related to the incident may also be saved and added to the 
incident folder.   
 
Maps 
ASOCC does not come with maps pre-installed.  Each node must find and store maps that 
fit its needs from other sources.  Sources include: 
 
· NIMA's SIPRNET web site 
 
· Geo-registered base maps used by installation Pub lic Works/Civil Engineering 
departments 
 
· Commercial mapping programs 
 
· Manually geo-registered map images 
 
The echelon one will maintain information on recommended mapping sources and files of 
geo-registered images in folders in its DCTS AOR room for all to use.  Other nodes may add 
images to this list at any time. 
 
Web Site Monitoring   
Each node may monitor web sites of interest using the KnowledgeBoard tool.  However, 
the echelon one will maintain a list of recommended web sites in a file in the AOR room on 
DCTS and may specify sites that all nodes should monitor.  Any node may recommend 
additional sites containing useful information to the AOR. 
 
 WMD Events and Industrial Accident Situations 
WMD events and industrial accidents may affect large areas.  Defining those areas as 
quickly as possible after the event takes place is critical to minimizing potential harm to military 
and civilian personnel, and provides for more timely resumption of normal operations.  Using the 
CATS tool in ASOCC, installation security forces will initiate calculation of areas affected and 
what predicted impact it will have on military and civilian centers.  If a WMD event or industrial 
accident occurs in other regions, it is important to immediately promulgate all I&W information 
as a preventative measure against possible multiple attacks.  
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Mission Phases 
 The ASOCC system integrates surveillance and communication capabilities to enable 
effective and efficient performance of HLS/HLD missions within a given AOR, including 
maritime security, AT/FP, maritime safety, law enforcement, environmental protection, and 
national security.  ASOCC watchstanders located within the “incident-level” at JHOCs/EOCs 
will coordinate the activities of first-responders and supporting forces from U.S. Navy, U.S. 
Coast Guard, local base commanders, along with local/State/Federal agencies.  ASOCC 
watchstanders located at the RCCs/ROCs will serve as the key transition node between the 
incident-level and the multi-echelon (e.g. National) level nodes.  As a crises develops, the 
primary role of ASOCC watchstanders operating within the “incident level” is to coordinate the 
engagement of appropriate resources as quickly as possible.  These “incident level” ASOCC 
operators, who are located at the JHOC and/or EOC, are tied into their local sensor suites and 
local intelligence agencies, and presumably would have been developing situational awareness 
for hours, days, or even weeks preceeding any potential event.  Once an incident occurs, the 
Navy Regional Commander would stand up their RCC/ROC in order to manage the crisis from a 
regional support level.  ASOCC watchstanders located at the RCC/ROC would serve as the 





 The following notional manning plan is envisioned to support an ASOCC node. 
 
System Administrator.  To ensure the smooth functioning of ASOCC, an ASOCC system 
administrator at the echelon one level is required.  This person will:   [Not certain at what level 
support personnel should occur- keep it divided by AOR or centralize into 1-3 regional areas?] 
 
· Monitor the status of ASOCC nodes and adjust peer-to-peer relationships as required, 
 
· Provide Tier II maintenance support to ASOCC workstations in the AOR, 
 
· Maintain a database on the configuration and ASOCC software version at each node, 
 
· Perform or coordinate installation of new software releases, 
 
· Do ASOCC user and local administrator training, 
 
Operations Support.  A second position at the echelon one level is required to support users.  
The person in this position will: 
 
· Configure the XIS tool to access locally designed and remote databases for all nodes 
in the AOR, 
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· Provide quality control for local databases used as sources for ASOCC, 
 
· Identify remote databases of interest to ASOCC users and arrange for ASOCC access 
to them, 
 
· Identify and demonstrate mapping sources that may be of interest to ASOCC users, 
 
· Assist ASOCC nodes in developing and sharing overlays, shape files, etc. that could 
be used in ASOCC,  
 




The recent series of attacks on U.S. civilian and military forces, coupled with the United 
State’s very visible leadership role in the Global War against terrorism, have changed the world 
environment forever.  For perhaps the first time in its history, the U.S. cannot take for granted 
the relative security of its ports, infrastructure, territory, and territorial waters.  The potentially 
devastating asymmetric threats posed by terrorists, coupled with the challenging complexities 
associated with defending the vast expanse of potential U.S. targets, demands a previously 
unrealized level of cooperation and collaboration between military forces and local/State/Federal 
agencies.  Improvements in overlapping sensors, non-lethal/lethal weapons, and intelligence 
gathering all have an important their role in anti-terrorism/force protection.  Yet investments in 
these areas will not have the desired effect unless they are coupled with the proper tools, 
processes, and communication strategies to affect cooperation among the various agencies and 
activities having explicit responsibilities for Homeland Security/Homeland Defense.      
 
The development, fielding, and active utilization of an integrated C4ISR system dedicated to 
the HLS/HLD mission is critical to effectively synchronizing the cooperative resources and 
actions of these law enforcement, military, and civilian agencies.  The ASOCC toolkit made up 
of fully- integrated GOTS and COTS software installed on commercial desktop computers, 
provides its users with the capability to command, control, and coordinate AT/FP efforts across 
multiple echelons and authorities.  While this DISA approved software component is in phase I 
of its spiral development, it offers an important first step in meeting the Navy’s requirements for 
operational deployment of an AT/FP C4ISR network.   
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APPENDIX A:  NOTIONAL AT/FP SCENARIO 
 
Introduction. 
Within the scenario, the national intelligence community will develop information and 
assessments that Al Quaeda has obtained weapons of mass destruction and is shipping them to 
the U.S. on merchant ships.  The intelligence will then be developed to the point that the Navy 
[NAVNORTH] is able to intercept and neutralize the ships under the direction of NORTHCOM 
in a homeland defense [HLD] mission. 
 
In related events, a terrorist cell in San Diego will plan and execute a suicide attack 
against NAS North Island using a stolen propane tanker.  The attack is mitigated by the 
defensive posture at the gate, where traffic bollards prevent access to the base.  The resulting 
collision explodes the tanker contents, with the subsequent damage and fire confined to the 
immediate gate area adjacent to the harbor. 
 
Finally, NAS North Island security forces will react to an intrusion alert along the carrier 
exclusion zone involving a small power boat.  This will prove to be a non-threat event. 
 
Scenario considerations:- 
1. The contents described are limited to actions conducted horizontally and vertically 
within the affected area only. 
2. Certain actions and intelligence-gathering/assessment activities are taking place 
outside the ASOCC domain, (i.e. outside networks, telephone, wireless 
communications, etc.) 
 
Scenario matrix design-  
 The matrix design separates the ASOCC entries into phases designed to illustrate the 
conceptual development of the event and to emphasize the versatility of the ASOCC 
functions. 
 








Crisis Mgt  Consequence Mgt  
 
Explanation of matrix contents-  
The ASOCC entries described within the matrix fall into five categories: 
1. Informational- realtime awareness 
2. Informational- reporting/responding 
3. Informational- database postings (DCTS) 
4. Action required- realtime C4ISR operations 
5. Action required- C2 and coordination (DCTS)] 
 
Non-ASOCC entries describing situational developments are listed in brackets. 
 










Crisis Mgt  Consequence 
Mgt  
National JITF-CT posts notice 






terrorists will launch 
attacks against U.S. 
port in 
the near future.  
Attacks are 
postulated to include 
attacks from the sea 
by ships that could 
have 
WMD onboard, and 




HLS Nebraska Ave 






“elevated” to “high”. 
 
FBI HQ posts 















JHOC/EOC San Diego police 
report increase in 
numbers of  
students in San Diego 
State University 
who have expired 
passports.  One 
individual 
has numerous 
pictures of local 
bridges and 
tunnels in his 
automobile. 
 
NAS North Island 
NCIS posts advisory 
conspicuous inquiries 
about the base. 
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DAY-2 




Crisis Mgt  Consequence 
Mgt  
National IC reports indications 
that 
WMD materials may 
be aboard 
ships headed toward 
Long 




OHLS posts alert of 
threat to coastal areas 
from terrorists aboard 
merchant ships. 
Navy Operations 




readiness to sortie 
ships and ensure 
base FPCONs are 
updated. 
 
NOC directs Naval 
Reserve to deploy 
harbor and security 
units to Puget 









of FPCON.  
 NCIS/Multiple Threat 
Analysis Ctr. Posts 
advisory 
that latest PIVA (Port 
Integrated Vulnerability 
Assessment) for Naval 
ports available in DCTS 
room. 
 
DTRA posts advisory of 
DCTS location of  
checklists for requesting 
support from DTRA. 
 
NORTHCOM posts 
advisory that the Navy and  
Coast Guard are 
collaborating in defensive 
measures 




COMPACFLT posts alert 
to Region SW to join in  
DCTS collaboration with 
DTRA to discuss CBRNE 
 response plans. 
 
RCC/ROC  Region SW directs 
test/report of  
sensor system 
readiness at North 
Island. 
 Washington and 
California DEM EOCs 
post 
coastal evacuation plans in 
DCTS. 
 
JHOC/EOC San Diego Police Dept. 
posts a 
notice of the theft of a 
propane 
tanker with a summary 
of the  
vehicle description. 
  Emergency Services for 
affected areas post maps 
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DAY-3 






Crisis Mgt  Consequence Mgt  















 NIPC posts advisory that 
port  
authorities and industry 
groups 
in threatened area have 
been 
issued threat advisories. 
 
JTF-CS posts alert to 
NIMA of 
 request for facilities 
maps/imagery 
 of threatened port. 
 
NIMA posts advisory 
pointing to 
 maps/imagery in DCTS 
room. 
NORTHCOM HQ posts 
alert for 




NAVNORTH reports its 
assessment that  
most of the suspect ships 
can be stopped 
before the 200-mile 
nautical limit of 
territorial waters.  Two 
ships are closer 
to shore and will be 
stopped and searched by  
the U.S. Coast Guard. 




 FBI alerts San Diego 
JHOC 
to National Law 
Enforcement 
Telecommunications 
message (NLET) and posts 
messages in DCTS.  
 









was intended for 
men 






 San Diego JHOC posts 
alert to  
peer-to-peer nodes to meet 
in 
collaboration space to 
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DAY-4 






Crisis Mgt  Consequence 
Mgt  
National JITF posts report 
concerning a raid 
against 
a terrorist planning 
cell in vicinity of 
Jakarta.  Raid yields 
knowledge of 
planned 
major attack against 













posts alert that 




 NORTHCOM asks DTRA to 
perform a “worst-case”  analysis 
to 
likely fallout pattern of 
biological weapon. 
 
A ship bound for Port of San 
Diego is identified as a likely 
culprit; JITF-CT posts advisory 
pointing to reports posted in 
DCTS from the IC providing 
more info on ship’s type.  
  
NAVNORTH HQ posts alert to 
NORTHCOM, JTF-CS, DTRA, 
Coast Guard, and IC to join in 
collaborative planning in DCTS 
to plan intercept of merchant 
ship with biological weapon 
aboard. 
 
Collaborative session initiated 
via NetMeeting; participants 
provide info with likely 
responses to various courses of 
action.  DTRA provides 
assessments with shared files 
(maps) via white board.   
 
RCC/ROC    California state EMD EOC 
posts alert of DCTS posting: 
a) Governor’s Proclamation 
b) State WMD checklist 
c) SITREP 
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DAY-5 
 Indications & 
Warnings 




National NCIS posts warning to 
San Diego port 
about possible 
ancillary 
attacks by speedboat 
or 
other delivery vehicle. 
NORTHCOM posts advisory 
that all merchant  
ships suspected to have 
terrorist connections have  
been located, intercepted, 
seized and neutralized  




COMPACFLT HQ posts 
advisory that Navy  
will conduct tactical 
reconnaissance missions  
over San Diego area.  
   
RCC/ROC [Region SW ROC 
monitors radio  
report of California 
Highway  
Patrol in pursuit 
of propane  
tanker approaching 
NAS  
North Island.  Vehicle  
matches description of 
stolen 
tanker reported Day -1] 
Region SW ROC directs San 
Diego Navy bases 
to set FPCON Delta; requests 
assist of Coronado 




   
JHOC/EOC CNRSW SM -10 
camera 
system alerts a 
violation  
of virtual barrier 
around 
carrier pier. 
 San Diego JHOC diverts 
Harbor police 
And Coast Guard assets 
to assist Navy  




[Patrols report intruder 
to be druken 
recreational boater; 
vessel escorted 
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DAY-6 








Consequence Mgt  
National   PACOM directs San 
Diego Navy 
bases to FPCON 
Delta. 
 NORTHCOM coordinates activities 
with LFA to execute Federal Response 
Plan. 
RCC/ROC   Region SW reports 
FPCON Delta set. 
 SW Region shares live sensor input of 
explosion  
site activity in DCTS.     
JHOC/EOC   [NAS North Island 
Security reports 
tanker engagement 
with gate bollards 
near harborside 
entrance, resulting in 




 San Diego JHOC requests 
assist from Harbor Fire 
along waterside adjacent 





  74 
 
APPENDIX B:  ACQUISITION/LOGISTICS STRATEGY 
 
Acquisition/Logistics Strategy 
ASOCC acquisition will be somewhat simplified because the software is a Government 
off-the-shelf (GOTS) item, while the associated hardware consists of Commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) equipment.  The current strategy for Phase I of the acquisition is to have the “end user” 
(e.g. Fleet Commanders on both coasts) bear the cost of initial procurement, with follow-on ILS 
costs being handled by a program office currently in development. Initial procurement of 
ASOCC will be in the form of an ASOCC pilot deployment in the major fleet concentration 
areas for each fleet commander (San Diego and Norfolk).  Depending upon the SOW, this pilot 
could provide ASOCC terminals at multiple echelons within each command, as well as initial 
training for watch standers and on-site technical support to help the user configure the ASOCC 
software to meet evolving AT/FP CONOPS.  
 
As the ashore AT/FP C2 system, ASOCC will be part of a larger ashore C4ISR 
architecture which includes such things as emergency dispatch centers and base operating and 
management systems.  As of this writing N46 has sponsored a study by PMW 157 to identify an 
ashore C4ISR architecture to include ashore AT/FP C2.  N46 has granted oversight of this study 
to N34 and CFFC as the AT/FP assessment and requirements sponsors.  This oversight will 
ensure that ASOCC is utilized for ashore AT/FP C2.  Results of this study are to be used as input 
into the POM ’06 budget process.  This will inject ASOCC into the PPBS system, relieving the 
fleet commands of any financial burdens beyond the initial procurement of the pilot deployment.   
 
Phase I Implementation 
(To be written.  Need to discuss first installment of terminals in San Diego, Hawaii and Norfolk.  
Actual locations:  JHOC, Regional Dispatch, Regional Command Center, C3F, CPF, ????   
Discuss spiral development goals.  Key issue is development of information sharing strategies 
that work among functional workgroups and regional groups, Joint centers, and don’t clutter up 
terminals at the very highest levels.  How is information going to be shared among work groups 
and then summary data pushed to higher levels.) 
  
Training Support 
The National Terrorism Preparedness Institute (NTPI) is currently chartered to conduct 
ASOCC training and produce training materials. 
 
Online training materials can be found on the following unclassified web site:  
http://terrorism.spjc.edu/ASOCC.htm .  
 
NTPI also will periodically conduct mobile training.  [Is this contracted in initial ASOCC 
deployment?] 
  
Echelon one ASOCC support personnel (see below) will assist NTPI trainers in a “train-the-
trainer” role and coordinate NTPI training in the AOR. 
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APPENDIX C:  OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
 
The following operational definitions will be used throughout this document: 
 
Antiterrorism (AT).  Deterrent/defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of personnel 
and resources to terrorist attack. 
 
Counter-terrorism (CT).  Offensive measures, including the gathering of information and threat 
analysis, taken to prevent, deter, and respond to acts of terrorism. 
 
Consequence Management.  Predominantly an emergency management function that includes 
measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide 
emergency relief to individuals and organizations affected by the consequences of terrorism. 
 
Crisis Management.  Predominantly a law enforcement function that includes measures to 
identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a 
threat or act of terrorism.  In a terrorist incident, a crisis management response may include 
traditional law enforcement missions, such as intelligence, surveillance, tactical operations, 
negotiations, forensics, and investigations, as well as technical support missions, such as agent 
identification, search, render safe procedures, transfer and disposal, and limited decontamination. 
 
Deterrence.  Overt physical security enhancements and other measures used to 
discourage/dissuade potential terrorists from selecting/attacking potential targets. 
 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC).  The site from which civil government and/or military 
officials (municipal, county, State and Federal) exercise direction and control in an emergency. 
 
Federal On-Scene Commander (F-OSC).  The FBI official designated upon JOC activation to 
ensure appropriate coordination of the overall U.S. government response with Federal, State and 
local authorities, until such time as the Attorney General transfers the LFA role to FEMA. 
 
First Responder.  Local fire, police, and emergency medical personnel who first arrive on the 
scene of an incident and take action to save lives, protect property, and meet basic needs 
 
Force Protection (FP).  The blended integration of antiterrorism measures, physical security, 
operations security (OPSEC), protective services, law enforcement operations, foreign 
intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other security actions. 
 
Indications and Warning (I&W).  Results from the focused and aggressive merging of (1) 
intelligence information gathering/dissemination with respect to suspected terrorist groups, 
methods of operation, potential targets, attack methodology, etc., and (2) real- time situational 
awareness/analysis of the areas to be protected.  Successful I&W enables timely/anticipatory 
action to counter emergent threats. 
 
Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC).  The site from which U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard 
personnel, along with selected representatives from municipal, county, State, and Federal 
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agencies, exercise direction and control over the activities associated with protection of harbor 
assets and infrastructure. 
 
Joint Information Center (JIC).  Center established to coordinate Federal public information 
activities on-scene.  It is the central point of contact for all news media at the scene of the 
incident, and should include all public information officials from all participating Federal 
Agencies.  Public information officials from participating State and local agencies may also 
collocate at the JIC. 
 
Joint Operations Center (JOC).  Normally established by the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) under 
the operational control of the Federal On-Scene-Commander (F-OSC), as the focal point for 
management and direction of onsite activities, coordination/establishment of State 
requirements/priorities, and coordination of the overall Federal response. 
 
Lead Federal Agency (LFA).  The Federal department or agency assigned lead responsibility to 
manage and coordinate the Federal response in a specific functional area.  Normally the LFA for 
Crisis Management is the Department of Justice (delegated to the FBI), with FEMA acting as the 
LFA for Consequence Management. 
 
On-Scene Coordinator (OSC).  The Federal official pre-designated by the EPA and USCG to 
coordinate and direct the response/removals of Oil and Hazardous Substances.  
 
Prevention.  Measures designed to thwart the acts of terrorists before an action can be completed 
or an objective can be achieved.  Prevention efforts can be either overt (in the case of deterrence 
and/or reaction), or covert (e.g. surveillance, detection, identification, alertment, etc.) 
 
Reaction.  Actions that control the course of a terrorist incident and limit the resulting damage 
when both deterrence and prevention have failed. 
 
Recovery.  Includes all types of emergency actions dedicated to the continued protection of the 
public or to promoting the resumption of normal activities in the affected area. 
 
Regional Commander.  The U.S. Navy Flag officer assigned to as the Commander of one of the 
Navy’s seven regional headquarters, responsible for the protection and support of all 
infrastructure (e.g. bases, airfields, facilities, equipment, etc.) within the designated region.  
 
Regional Director.  The Director of one of FEMA’s ten regional offices and principal 
representative for working with other Federal regions, State and local governments, and the 
private sector in that jurisdiction. 
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APPENDIX B JHOC DRAFT CONOPS   
 
March 24, 2003  
 
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS  
FOR  
SAN DIEGO JOINT HARBOR OPERATIONS CENTER 




The confluence of federal, state and local missions in the maritime environment provide the 
motivation to integrate Navy Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism forces, Coast Guard Maritime 
Homeland Security forces, and Civil Law Enforcement forces in a coherent and fully functional 
joint operations cell.  Establishment of a Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC) of Coast Guard, 
Navy and other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies allows for unity of force and 
command in day to day operations, initial responses in emergency situations, and Consequence 
Management (CM) operations when required. 
 
Individually, the Navy’s Homeland Defense (HLD) mission is to conduct operations in defense 
of United States territories as well as Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection operations for military 
units under its control. The Coast Guard’s Homeland Security (HLS) mission is to protect the 
U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. Maritime Transportation System and deny their use and 
exploitation by terrorists as a means of attack on U.S. Territory, population, and critical 
infrastructure. Federal, state and local law enforcement authorities are charged with enforcing 
civil/criminal statutes and protecting the general population. Together, these missions are 
complimentary and overlapping. Furthermore, other federal agencies such as FBI, Directorate of 
Border Transportation Security (BTS), local and state law enforcement organizations, routinely 
support port security and AT/FP missions in U.S. ports with Navy presence.  
 
The integration of an operational command and control system for these forces is essential and 
will provide a common situational awareness across the spectrum of organizations involved. This 
system should provide collaborative course-of-action planning, analysis, execution, and 
monitoring; interoperable secure communications among decision-makers and response assets; 
and other tactical decision aides that support key functions, such as operational risk management 
and response asset readiness monitoring. 
 
The overarching goal of this system is to collect, process, facilitate fusion, and disseminate data 
from a variety of disparate, geographically separated, sensors and static information sources and 
provide the decision support necessary for key decision-makers in a timely enough manner to 
identify, target, interdict, engage and re-engage, if necessary, and destroy/thwart asymmetric 
threats through coordinated interagency actions. 
 
The JHOC will improve the command and control and coordination of the multi-agency efforts 
to deter, detect and defend against asymmetrical terrorist threats offshore and within the Port of 
San Diego by leveraging the collective efforts and limited resources of the stakeholders and 
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optimizing their use.  The JHOC is designed to take full advantage of the synergistic effect of 
collocating watchstanders from the Coast Guard, Navy, and OGA stakeholders at the U.S Coast 
Guard Activities San Diego Operations Center.  Additionally, the JHOC promotes the enhanced 
coordination of incident management and consequence management activities between federal, 
state and local agencies, including interoperability with the Incident Command System (ICS) 
during chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRNE) events, as well as the 
routine response to standard law enforcement activities. 
 
The organizations involved in staffing the JHOC in Phase I are Commander Navy Region 
Southwest, Coast Guard Activities San Diego, and San Diego Harbor Police.  Three locations 
have been identified to house the JHOC capabilities, including USCG Activities San Diego 
Operations Center, CNRSW Emergency Operations Center, and Commander Third Fleet.  This 




- To improve situational awareness (SA) and responsiveness of participating organizations in 
day-to-day operations, both in the seaward approaches to San Diego and within the port itself. 
 
To improve command, control and coordination of multi-agency efforts to deter, detect and 
defend against asymmetrical terrorist threats offshore and within the Port of San Diego by 
leveraging the collective efforts and limited resources of the stakeholders and optimizing their 
use.   
 
To enhance coordination of Incident Management (IM) and Consequence Management (CM) 
activities between federal, state and local agencies, including interoperability with the Incident 
Command System (ICS) during chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives 
(CBRNE) events.  
 
The JHOC will accomplish these objectives by taking full advantage of the synergistic effects of 
co-locating watch standers from the Navy, Coast Guard, and OGA stakeholders at the designated 
JHOC location and leveraging technologies such as Area Security Operations Command and 
Control (ASOCC) system to develop and maintain a Common Operating Picture.  
 
 
III. Concept of Operations 
A. Daily Operations 
1. Maintain situational awareness of current activities and de-
conflict off-shore and in port operations through the use of the Common 
Operational Picture (COP). 
2. Monitor, track and record deep draft vessel traffic including 
moored and anchored vessels. 
3. Monitor and track other vessel activity for suspicious and/or 
anomalous activity. 
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4. Receive and coordinate initial investigation of suspicious and/or 
anomalous activities  
5. Monitor radios for voice traffic. 
6. Maintain a real time and historical vessel traffic database. 
7. Maintain a weather watch. 
8. Compare actual vessel arrival information with scheduled arrival 
information. 
9. Schedule Sea Marshal escorts, as required. 
10. Establish and maintain dialogue with the local pilots associations 
concerning vessel movements. 
11. Produce a daily authorized vessel entry list (AVEL) for the Port 
of San Diego. 
12. Maintain continuous MDA (commercial vessels in port, cargo 
operations, Blue Force activities, channel clearings, special events, HVA/HIVs, 
and boardings).  
13. Monitor escorts of CLASS “A” USN/USNS and other High 
Value Assets. 
14. Assist with de-confliction of high value asset and deep draft 
vessel transits. 
15. Monitor boarding operations, High Interest Vessel boardings in 
particular. 
16. Respond to requests for information from federal, state and local 
level authorities. 
 
B. Initial Response to Threat Activities 
1. Participating agencies will retain Tactical Control (TACON) of their assets 
through existing C2 organizations.   
a. Diverting USN assets should be avoided to ensure 
continuous protection of USN vessels and facilities. 
b. Divert/launch the most appropriate law enforcement 
asset(s) to investigate or intercept threats/targets of interest. 
c. Alert all participating agencies about threats/targets of 
interest.   
d. Requests for USCG assets will go directly to the Coast 
Guard Activities Operations Duty Officer. 
e. Requests for Harbor Police assets will go directly to 
Harbor Police Dispatch.  
f. Requests for Navy Security assets will go directly to 
Regional Dispatch Center (NRDC)/Emergency Operations Center (EOC). 
Navy Security response outside of designated Security Zones is pending 
MOU between USN and USCG. 
g. All participating agencies will agree to comply with 
JHOC asset requests whenever feasible. 
h. Maintain MDA 
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i. Control/restrict vessel movements in- bound/out-bound 
the Port of San Diego and the Regulated Navigation Area (RNA), when 
established. 
j. Blue Force Coordination: Provide tactical coordination 
between available law enforcement (federal, state, and local) and 
protective (USN Force Protection) assets.  
2. Coordinate utilization of DOD combatants to mitigate threats. 
3. Coordinate EOD/Mine Countermeasures to mitigate threats.  
4. Coordinate USN and commercial towing and salvage resources. 
5. Coordinate information dissemination to appropriate commands and stakeholders.  
 
C. Consequence Management 
1. Coordinate establishment and enforcement of safety perimeters.  
2. Initiate the Incident Command System (ICS).  
3. Assist and support designated Incident Commander.  
4. Coordinate vessel traffic control. 
 
D. Sensors/Systems 
1. The JHOC will utilize an informational technology architecture that will integrate 
sensors, agency databases, and intelligence information to provide common 
situational awareness for decision-makers and security assets via a shared 
Common Operational Picture  over a server-based intranet link to all designated 
shareholders utilizing a Virtual Private Network (VPN).  
2. Sensors will include video, radar, thermal imaging, sonar systems, and ACTD 
Direction Finding System (position localization).  
3. Related systems include Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Blue Force 
Locating System. 
4. Databases will include National Criminal Information Center (NCIC); 
Automated Regional Justice Information System (ARJIS); Marine Information 
Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE); Joint Maritime Information Element 
(JMIE), SEALINK, ELINT query, and Global Command and Control System 
Marine/Joint(GCCS-M/J). 
 
E. Rules of Engagement/Use of Force 
1.  Policies:  
All participating agencies will continue to operate under their existing Rules of 
Engagement and Use of Force policies in accordance with their parent 
organizations’ rules and regulations. 
 
2.  Oversight: 
It is recognized that the majority of Small Boat and Point Defense Use of 
Force/Rules of Engagement decisions must be made within seconds or minutes 
on scene.  In rare circumstances where there is the time or need for UOF/ROE 
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guidance or permission, participating assets will contact their tactical 
commander for guidance (participating agencies will retain TACON of their 
assets through existing C2 organizations). 
 
IV. Command Relationships 
A. Watch Organization 
The JHOC will have three watch standers, one USCG, one USN and one San Diego 
Harbor Police. The watchstanders will be assigned COP terminals (Two SIPR and One 
NIPR terminals) based on their Security Clearance within the JHOC space. 
B. Watchstander Responsibilities  
Option I: 
One watchstander is designated as the Watch Commander. This individual is assigned 
authority to coordinate the movement of all available assets through the other 
watchstanders within the JHOC. The watchstanders will contact their respective 
dispatch centers to coordinate Blue Force movement. TACON remains within the 




All watchstanders are equal (e.g.: no Watch Commander) and responsible to their 
parent organizations for direction of organizational assets. Individual watchstanders in 
the JHOC have responsibility to coordinate dispatch of their own resources while 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
 
 
1. Defense Technical Information Center     2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  22060-6218 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library, Code 013      2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5100 
 
3. Research Office, Code 09        1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5138 
 
4. Mike Stumborg        1 
 Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
 716 Sicard St SE, Bldg 111 
 Washington Navy Yard, DC  20388-5380 
 
5. Mike Dorsey         1 
 Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
 716 Sicard St SE, Bldg 111 
 Washington Navy Yard, DC  20388-5380 
 
6. LCDR Tim Tutt         1 
 Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
 716 Sicard St SE, Bldg 111 
 Washington Navy Yard, DC  20388-5380 
 
7. LTJG Eric Westlin         1 
 Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
 716 Sicard St SE, Bldg 111 
 Washington Navy Yard, DC  20388-5380 
 
8. Bill VonStorch         1 
 Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
 716 Sicard St SE, Bldg 111 
 Washington Navy Yard, DC  20388-5380 
 
9. Special Agent Cliff Link        1 
 Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
 716 Sicard St SE, Bldg 111 




10. Special Agent Warren Brownley       1 
 Commander Navy Region Mid-Atlantic 
1510 GILBERT ST  
ATTN:  N2/SSA Brownley 
Norfolk VA  23511-2737 
 
11.  Kim Kelly, Special Agent        1 
 NCIS 
 3405 Welles St., Suite 1 
San Diego, CA   92136-5050 
 
12. Gordon Schacher        2 
 Wayne Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 777 Dyer Rd., Rm 100D 
 Monterey, CA  93943 
 
13. Shelley Gallup        5 
 Wayne Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 777 Dyer Rd., Rm 100D 
 Monterey, CA  93943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
